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In September 2001, the Swiss Government accepted a
postulate by the Commission for Foreign Policy of the
Federal Parliament. The postulate asked the government
to develop the instrument of human rights dialogues
within the human rights foreign policy. In 2004, the
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued an
internal briefing paper for this policy. To further develop
the instrument, the Human Rights Policy Section of the
DFA asked the German Institute for Human Rights in
early 2005 to elaborate a study on this comparably 
recent instrument of foreign policy with special attention
to measurement of impact.
A commitment to the universal validity of human rights
does not lead to a predetermined, uniform pattern of
bilateral human rights policy towards all countries. A
different approach is possible and necessary: Depend-
ing on the context of the respective country, the imple-
mentation of human rights concerns requires a set of
instruments that follows different goals and strategies
and sets different thematic priorities. In my opinion, this
applies for human rights dialogues as well. 
The present study elaborates the instrument of the in-
stitutionalized or formalized human rights dialogue. It
focuses on the measurement of impact of human rights
dialogues, an area that has not yet received sufficient
attention. For states conducting human rights dia-
logues the study contains valuable recommendations
for the planning, design, implementation and evalua-
tion of future dialogues.
I thank the authors, Anna Würth and Frauke Lisa 
Seidensticker, for the study. It is to be hoped that 
future dialogues may find ideas here for their planning. 
Berne, November 2005
Wolfgang Amadeus Brülhart
Head of the Human Rights Policy Section
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Preface
6
7Contents
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1 Impact of Human Rights Norms  . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1 Reasons for Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Impact of Human Rights Norms . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Planning Human Rights Dialogues  . . . . . . . . 16
2.1 Situation Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Setting Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Strategy Development and Coordination . . 17
2.4 Activities and Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 Measuring Impact: Forms and Methods  . . . . 21
3.1 Forms of Impact Assessment  . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Methods of Measuring Impact  . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 The Debate on the Quantitative Description
of Human Rights Performance  . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 Indices, Indicators and Benchmarks: Defini-
tions, Scope, and Their Potential Uses  . . . . 22
3.3 Mechanisms for Gathering Data: 
Strengths and Weaknesses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 The Practice of Impact Assessment  . . . . . . . . 27
4.1 Dialogue Model: Changes on 
the Normative Level  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.1 Impact Assessment Based on Indices  . . . . 27
4.1.2 Impact Assessment Based on 
Qualitative Benchmarks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Dialogue Model: Changes in 
Human Rights Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.1 Impact Assessment Based 
on Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.2 Impact Assessment Based on Indicators 30
4.3 Dialogue Model: 
Improving the Human Rights Situation  . 31
4.3.1 Measuring the Reduction in 
Human Rights Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.1.1 Impact Assessment Based on Indices  . . . 31
4.3.1.1.1 Freedom House Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.1.1.2 Human Rights Indices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.1.2    Impact Assessment Based on Qualitative
Benchmarks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.1.2.1 Qualitative Benchmarks in 
Annual Country Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.1.2.2 Qualitative Benchmarks in 
EU Human Rights Dialogues, Especially 
the EU Dialogue with Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.2    Monitoring the Human Rights Situation
Multi-Dimensionally  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Conclusion: Impact Assessment 
for Human Rights Dialogues  . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Literature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Contents
8Bilateral Human Rights Dialogues are a recent instru-
ment in governmental human rights policy. Often criti-
cized as lacking transparency and results, human rights
dialogues are increasingly subject to guidelines and
evaluations and held in multilateral fora to offset neg-
ative effects of the bilateralization of human rights con-
cerns. This study examines these recent attempts to 
increase the transparency and result-based orientation
in governmental human rights dialogues. 
In the first chapter, the study analyses political science
literature on the statistical impact of treaty ratification
and on qualitative change in a country’s human rights
record to support the thesis that partners in a human
rights dialogue need to specify their goals precisely. In
particular, it is argued that ratification of treaties as a
goal should be distinguished from the goal of im-
provements in the overall human rights record. 
The second chapter proposes goal-setting on clearly 
distinct levels: from ratification of human rights instru-
ments up to solid institutional guarantees for human
rights. Analysing the limited documentation publicly
available, it is contended that planning for human
rights dialogues needs to make use of up-to-date 
human rights methodology, that is, analyse the human
rights record in terms of state obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights. Furthermore, planning
for a dialogue should take up existing international ma-
terial, in particular the Concluding Observations by
United Nations treaty bodies and the recommendations
of Special Rapporteurs. When setting goals for a 
dialogue, partners need to be aware of the different 
levels of goals, and how they relate in terms of impact.
It is demonstrated that the relation between treaty
ratification and implementation is mainly discursive,
whereas specific policies, for example policies to in-
crease access to justice, may have a more concrete and
measurable impact on the human rights situation. In
terms of strategy, the study stresses the importance of
coordination among different bilateral actors wishing
to start a human rights dialogue. 
Summary 
Partners may have different motives for starting a 
human rights dialogue. It is contended that this does
not necessarily constitute a major problem as long as
motives and goals are of an equivalent order and trans-
parent, and partners adjust topics and themes accord-
ingly. In general, partners should concentrate on a few
topics of common interest where they can share sub-
stantive respective experiences and views, rather than
touching upon all human rights issues in the most
general fashion. Partners should avoid privileging political
over social rights and vice-versa – a human rights dia-
logue should always respect that human rights are in-
divisible, and that effective human rights protection
poses major challenges for all countries. Lastly, it is sug-
gested that human rights dialogues adapt methods of
gender-sensitive project planning known from technical
cooperation, by devising clear goals, activities and the
results. Without differentiation between activities and
results human rights dialogues and, more generally,
support for human rights, can not be monitored for impact. 
Chapters three and four discuss measurement of impact
of human rights support and particularly human rights
dialogues. Chapter three expounds the theoretical
foundations, chapter four practical applications. A first
section introduces terminology: Impact monitoring is
understood as one of the instruments for project steer-
ing, based on a regular assessment of the results of
specified activities. Evaluation is defined in a narrow
technical sense, constituting the major instrument to
assess the impact of an intervention and the effec-
tiveness of the instruments used.
It is argued that so far human rights dialogues have been
subject to neither impact monitoring nor evaluations
in this sense. Rather, ex-post assessments were conduct-
ed which analyse the situation before and after a human
rights dialogue without assessing the effectiveness of
the dialogue. A second section deals with the different
methods of quantitative and qualitative measurement –
indices, indicators, and different forms of benchmark-
ing – and their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
Summary 
9Chapter four devises three possible models of human
rights dialogues. Each model is defined by its goal: 
dialogues which aim to change the normative environ-
ment in the partner state, for example by support for
ratification and enshrining treaty provisions in the 
national constitution or legislation; dialogues pursuing
change in specific human rights related policies, for ex-
ample conditions in prisons or pre-trial detention, and
lastly, dialogues conducted with the intention to con-
tribute to improvement of the overall governmental 
human rights record. These dialogues will include ob-
jectives on the level of legislation and policies but will
also strive to reduce the number and severity of viola-
tions. Each model is then examined as to how to mea-
sure progress and impact of the dialogue, whether by
using indices, indicators or different forms of bench-
marks. It is argued that changes in legislation can best
be monitored by qualitative benchmarks if those are
pegged to a specific time frame. Human rights sensi-
tive policy changes necessitate qualitative and quan-
titative measurement. This can best be achieved by
combining performance benchmarks and indicators.
Using the example of the EU-Iran-dialogue, the study
demonstrates that dialogues aiming at improving the
overall human rights record are usually assessed by
analysing the number and severity of human rights
violations. It is argued that this one-dimensional per-
spective is insufficient and does not do justice to the
complexity of any human rights situation. Rather,
changes in the human rights record should be conceived
as a process of multiple dimensions – law, policies,
and results thereof – and be measured accordingly, by
using a combination of benchmarking and indicators. 
Overall, the study recommends that goals for human
rights dialogues should be long-term, realistic and
transparent; planning should stress coordination and be
savvier, both in terms of human rights and planning
methodologies. In respect to impact monitoring, the
study conceives impact monitoring and evaluations
for human rights dialogues as necessary, but cautions
that monitoring – be it by quantitative or qualitative
indicators or benchmarking – constitutes only a pre-
liminary line of questioning into very complex politi-
cal processes. The study also points to the necessity to
collect data, with a particular view to gender, ethni-
city/region and social status. It recommends that part-
ners in a human rights dialogue should collect disaggre-
gate data in a sustainable fashion and utilize available
data to the maximum extent possible. 
Summary 
Human rights dialogues are a relatively recent instru-
ment of national human rights policy. First used in the
late 1980s, they have been employed with increasing
frequency since the mid and late 1990s. While such dia-
logues had originally been conceived as bilateral instru-
ments, there are now more and more efforts to coor-
dinate the dialogues as, for example, within the Berne
process for human rights dialogues with China (since
2001) and the Brussels-Berne process for human rights
dialogues with Iran (since 2003).
Institutionalized or formalized human rights dialogues
are publicly announced proceedings used by countries
to initiate political talks about human rights.1 The be-
ginning and the end of such talks are clearly defined,
with both sides being represented by regional as well
as technical experts. From time to time, the public in
the participating countries is informed about the agen-
da and the progress of the dialogues. Other conceptual
issues, such as which aspects of human rights are to 
receive most attention, depend on the situation in the
respective countries. They are agreed on by the partici-
pating countries, which often expect different, occa-
sionally even contradictory, things from the dialogues.
Usually, dialogues consist of political talks, meetings of
experts, and workshops. As a more recent develop-
ment, many dialogues now also include various com-
ponents of Technical Cooperation. Which of these ele-
ments are used above all, and how they are combined,
depends on the goals of the dialogue and on the de-
gree of partnership that exists between the two coun-
tries. The European Union (EU) is engaged in such for-
malized dialogues only with China (intermittently since
1996) as well as with Iran (2002-2004).
Formalized human rights dialogues must be distin-
guished from other kinds of dialogues. For example, in-
terfaith or intercultural dialogues are often conducted
by non-governmental organizations. Talks about the 
human rights situation as part of bilateral political 
relations or as part of treaties such as EU agreements
of association2 are likewise different from human rights
dialogues.3 Yet another way to address human rights 
issues consists of interventions on behalf of victims of
human rights violations in the partner country, often by
various diplomatic steps. The latter are unilateral and
confidential responses to specific occurrences.
Even the finest rhetoric of partnership cannot reduce
political or economic inequality between countries
conducting a human rights dialogue to a minor detail.4
The possibility of having a true dialogue, however, 
Introduction
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1 The EU uses the term “structured human rights dialogues” when referring to countries with which the EU has not concluded
any treaties that contain a human rights clause: Council of the EU (2001), para 2. Switzerland calls such talks “specific dialogues”
and defines them as being topic-oriented and “aiming at the establishment of bilateral relations characterized by continuity”:
Bundesrat (2000), 2592; a detailed discussion of this instrument from the Swiss point of view can be found in: DFA (2004),
Medium-term concept 2004-2007, 6ff. Germany has never adopted its own definition of human rights dialogues. Instead, it
refers to pertinent EU guidelines and activities: Auswärtiges Amt (2005), 282-284, 388-390, 419, 434, 448-455. Australia
declares human rights dialogues to be the “most effective way to address the human rights situation in other countries”. The
reasons for making this assertion are not provided, however, and the instrument is not defined either: Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (2004). 
2 The EU calls these instruments “agreement-based dialogues”: Among other activities, this term covers dialogues with candi-
dates for EU membership, relations under the treaty of Cotonou and the Barcelona process with Mediterranean countries:
Council of the EU (2001), para 2.
3 Good working definitions of the various possibilities of addressing human rights in negotiations with partner countries can be
found in: DFA (2004), 12-15. Thus, it is possible to engage in intensified bilateral human rights talks that are less formalized
than dialogues. Political dialogues with a human rights element: As part of regular political consultations, an additional day
could be scheduled to discuss certain human rights topics. Local human rights dialogues: Human rights talks can be held 
locally not only with representatives of the central government but also with regional administrative bodies.
4 Baaz cites rather eloquent examples that illustrate how the more recent discourse of partnership in development cooperation
may hide paternalistic attitudes: Baaz (2005).
depends on the question of whether and how govern-
ment representatives from both sides are willing to
listen to each other, on the goals that the partners in
this dialogue pursue, as well as on the clarity and
transparency of these goals.
As a matter of principle, human rights dialogues should
be studied with a view to their goals, and thus with a
view to the degree of partnership achieved by the par-
ticipants. Is the dialogue aimed at getting the respec-
tive partner to stop current human rights violations? If
so, dialogue sessions can become rather antagonistic,
with both partners accusing each other of human
rights violations and demanding their prevention. Or is
the dialogue intended to promote a certain human
rights policy, with other countries providing assistance,
particularly of an advisory nature? Such an objective has
the potential of being realized in a true dialogue, be-
cause the participating countries have to plan and carry
out the appropriate measures together. It is exactly this
mix of communicative and result-oriented processes
that determines the possibilities and chances of human
rights dialogues. If a dialogue aims at normative im-
provements in the partner country, that is to say, the
ratification of human rights conventions and their im-
plementation in the form of constitutional guarantees
and implementing laws, the partners must listen to each
other very carefully, because it is precisely this kind of
situation where the frank exchange on the doubts,
priorities and experience of both sides can, among
other things, determine the quality of a dialogue.
If the objectives of human rights dialogues are not
stated openly as well as clearly defined, it is almost im-
possible to achieve partnership, or even to assess the
impact of the dialogues, which is methodically difficult
under any circumstances.
As the instrument of human rights dialogues has been
used only for a relatively short period of time, there are
as yet no publicly available systematic studies of the in-
strument and the methods for assessing its effectiveness.
The lack of access to documents concerning bilateral
human rights dialogues is a fundamental problem. 
Often, the only publicly available documents are press
releases of little substance.5
During the late 1990s, the effectiveness of the dialogues
with China and Iran was questioned by non-govern-
mental organizations. According to critics, the human
rights dialogue with China had turned into a substitute
for resolutions and draft resolutions in the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights. Like the German dialogue
with Iran, it was also said to have been characterized
by a lack of transparent planning and agenda setting,
as well as by a lack of results, i.e. improvements in the
human rights situation.6 Regional experts voiced 
similar criticisms, too.7
Possibly in response to these critical comments, the EU
and various other countries have, since the start of
2000, increased their efforts to improve both the plan-
ning and the actual conduct of dialogues by coordi-
nating them, by controlling them with the help of
guidelines, as well as by assessing their success and 
impact. The latter of these efforts, which are rather
technical in nature, are the subject of this study. Ad-
mittedly, impact measurement builds on assumptions
and methods that suggest scientific precision where this
is hardly attainable due to the inherent complexity of
socio-political relationships and processes. Thus, the re-
sults of impact assessments can only be approximations
of a complex reality, expressed in the form of initial
questions rather than definitive answers. And yet, 
human rights dialogues and the promotion of human
rights, just like all other interventions in complex 
political systems, need to be scrutinized with regard to
the nature, reach, and quality of their impact in order
to ensure transparency as well as capability to learn
from mistakes. 
This study begins with an introduction to the debates
on the impact of human rights norms. It then looks at
the planning principles for human rights dialogues. In
the main part, various theoretical models for measur-
ing the dialogues’ impact are presented, which are
then applied to human rights dialogues in practice.
Above all, the study tries to determine the methods
most suited for impact assessment, taking into ac-
count the different goals dialogues may pursue. It con-
cludes with a number of recommendations.
Introduction
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5 The EU makes available some documents on its dialogues. Even so, essential parts of the documents remain confidential.
6 On the dialogue with China: Human Rights in China (1998); Deile (2000); Rights and Democracy (2001); Tibet Campaign / 
Human Rights in China / The International Campaign for Tibet (2003).
7 Hasenkamp (2004); Reissner (2000). 
Many human rights debates focus on questions con-
cerning the enforcement of human rights, with many
commentators actually speaking of an implementa-
tion crisis in this context. While this crisis has various
causes, one factor is the way in which the bodies of the
United Nations function. Another one is the unwilling-
ness of countries to implement ratified conventions. The
following sections will take a closer look at the last as-
pect by examining the motives that countries are 
guided by when they sign human rights conventions.
Thus, in section 1.1 it will be argued that the ratification
of conventions is an important goal of human rights 
dialogues. However, ratification does not always indi-
cate a government’s willingness to improve the human
rights situation. Section 1.2 deals with how human
rights norms work politically. How does change in a
country’s human rights situation come about, and
which political, national and international processes are
most likely to guarantee human rights permanently? 
Finally, these insights are applied to the formulation of the
objectives of human rights dialogues and their planning.
1.1 Reasons for Ratification of 
Human Rights Conventions
Generally, the promotion of human rights operates on
the assumption that the ratification of international
conventions entails the obligation to implement them
and to submit reports on the implementation process.
Often, however, the very ratification is already over-
shadowed by reservations. The attachment of sub-
stantive reservations usually means that the country in
question has no intention of implementing essential
provisions of the convention as national law. Thus, it
should come as no great surprise that most reservations
have been filed concerning the conventions on women’s
and children’s rights.
After ratification many countries comply with their
obligation to submit reports not at all, very inade-
quately, or extremely late.8 With regard to legislative
implementation, some countries maintain that they
must first pass the necessary legislation, which then
they do not do once the convention is ratified. Others
prevent their judges from enforcing human rights con-
ventions in court either by giving them insufficient
training or by limiting their jurisdiction. As far as the
implementation of human rights conventions is con-
cerned, a quantitative study by Oona Hathaway, a law
professor at Yale University, clearly shows that in many
countries ratification does not lead to any statistically
significant reduction in human rights violations even
after lengthy periods of time.9 From this she infers
that human rights policy should increase the capacity
for monitoring and “reward” improvements in imple-
1
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8 For a very detailed discussion see Bayefsky (2001), 193ff. In order to improve the effectiveness of the convention regime, as
well as cooperation with it, detailed proposals for reforming the system of reports have been worked out over the last few
years: United Nations, Secretary-General (2004).
9 A comparison of ratifying and non-ratifying countries produced the same results: Hathaway (2002), 1940, 1962ff. Hathaway
explains her findings by saying that the ratification of human rights conventions has a double meaning, and that each ratifying
country conveys both an instrumental-tactical and an expressive-discursive message. While the former means that conventions
come with certain obligations, the discursive message conventions tells other members of the international community some-
thing about the image the ratifying country aspires to, for example its intention to belong to the international community.
The instrumental-tactical and the discursive aspects of the ratification of human rights conventions have by now drifted further
and further apart. According to Hathaway, the reason for this development is the fact that implementation is not monitored
effectively. To the extent to which the international community rewards the discursive aspect of ratification (that is membership
of the group of state parties) rather than the actual implementation of human rights conventions, the implementation crisis
will persist. 
Neumayer (2004) rejects the validity of Hathaway’s results. But he too has to allow for certain limitations: “Treaties … engage
countries in a human rights process that is extremely difficult to demonstrate quantitatively.” Neumayer (2004), 32. Keith
(1999) reaches the same conclusions as Hathaway, although her analysis is not as thorough.
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mentation systematically. In sum, the message practice
counts should politically and practically be conveyed
more forcefully.
What does this mean for the promotion of human
rights and especially for human rights dialogues? Given
the practice of countries described above, it is possi-
ble to infer that ratification does not necessarily indi-
cate a country’s willingness to comply with its oblig-
ations under the conventions and to improve the 
human rights situation. With regard to the objective of
promoting human rights the appropriate conclusion
seems to be that ratification must be seen as one goal
and the implementation of the conventions as another
goal. There can be improvements in the human rights
situation without ratification of the conventions, while
ratification does not necessarily affect the human rights
situation. Nevertheless, ratification is an important refe-
rence tool for exerting political pressure in order to
bring about the implementation of the treaty obligations.
This idea will be developed further in the following 
section. However, the perspective will shift to the 
political processes that allow for human rights norms
to take effect. 
1.2 Impact of Human Rights Norms
How do human rights norms work and what are the 
essential mechanisms responsible for their effective-
ness? This question is mainly studied by those political
scientists who focus on political and civil rights.10 
Currently, there are two theoretical strands, the 
so-called realist school and the so-called constructivist
school respectively. The main difference between these
schools concerns the roles they assign to the factors
power, self-interest, compulsion and discourse, as well
as to various actors, above all, countries and (trans)na-
tional, civil-society actors.11
The realist school argues that countries accept and
implement norms only if they have to, that is, if they
can be forced to do so. From the point of view of this
school, the self-interest of countries also constitutes an
essential and necessary motive for the implementation
of norms. Thus, punitive measures, sanctions, and 
negative conditionality are seen as the most important
tools in dealing with economically vulnerable countries.
Above all, the central actors of human rights policy
should therefore be countries that have enough eco-
nomic and political power to exert the appropriate
pressure. It follows that internationally or regionally less
powerful countries cannot be important actors. Also, for
countries that are not very vulnerable economically
other instruments must be found. However, the realist
school has, as yet, not come up with an answer to the
question of how power might be tamed by power with
regard to human rights.12
The constructivist school offers a different argument.
They assign central roles to the factors discourse and
persuasion, as well as to transnational actors and 
national processes. The study by Risse, Sikkink, and
Ropp (1999) is particularly interesting. They set out
what they call the “spiral model”, which they use to 
explain changes in the human rights situation in a
number of countries between 1985 and 1995. They
attribute these changes, above all, to the work of the
central actors in this model, namely the transnational
human rights organizations. Empirical examples are
based on analyses of the developments in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tunisia and 
Morocco, all of which are considered to be econo-
mically vulnerable countries and to be a player on 
regional rather than on global level.
The model of Risse, Sikkink, and Ropp has some ana-
lytical weaknesses.13 In the context of this study, how-
ever, it is of interest mainly because of its description
of those social and political learning processes that
10 The way economic, social and cultural human rights norms work seems to enjoy rather less attention.
11 The best overview of the various theories is provided by Hathaway (2002), 1942-1962.
12 Another weakness of this approach is its one-sided fixation on state power. Norms are seen as implemented when states
comply with them. The national level beyond state actors is not considered at all. A detailed critique of this view is provided
by Cortell / Davis (2000). Moreover, self-interest, i.e. the central motive driving a state’s activities, can only be determined
ex post facto rather than substantively. Thus, it is also impossible to develop a strategy for human rights policy. In addition,
the argument is circular: If a country stops violating human rights, doing so must have been in its self-interest. If, on the
other hand, it does not change its behaviour, a change apparently cannot have been in its self-interest.
13 Above all else, it suffers from the same weakness as the realist model: If there are any changes in the human rights situation,
they can be explained ex post facto by the strength of the transnational human rights network. If, on the other hand, there
are no changes, this simply means that the transnational network was not strong enough. Since the exact nature of this
strength or weakness remains unclear, it is impossible to know what might be done to develop or boost this kind of strength.
As far as the development of strategies for human rights work is concerned, both the realist and constructivist school are
marred by the fact that they use as their explanatory variable that which is to be explained substantively, see Schwarz
(2002), 69. A comprehensive critique of the “spiral model” model can be found in Landolt (2004).
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bring about and accompany changes in the respect
for political and civil rights. The authors assume that
authoritarian regimes become more liberal because
the domestic opposition is strengthened by transnatio-
nal relations. A change of policy, or even a change of
government, occurs when domestic critics succeed in
establishing human rights as the basis of social oppo-
sition. This process unfolds in five phases in a movement
reminiscent of the shape of a spiral, hence the term
“spiral model”. 
It must be emphasized once more that the model is
based on an analysis of developments in economically
vulnerable countries. In countries with different char-
acteristics it is possible that governments do not move
beyond certain phases, or even that the human rights
situation worsens again.
Phase 1: 
Repression
During the first phase, the opposition is weak and very
little information about human rights violations reach-
es the outside world. If transnational networks manage
to put human rights violations on the international
agenda (above all, by releasing reports of their own and
by supporting resolutions in the Commission on Human
Rights and the General Assembly of the United Nations),
international public opinion will become more and
more active and denounce human rights violations.
Phase 2: 
The Validity of Norms is Denied
Increasing moral pressure leads to phase two during
which the government denies the universal validity of
human rights norms. Without even addressing the
charge of human rights violations, representatives of
the respective governments denounce human rights
norms as “Western”. In addition, they accuse the human
rights bodies of intergovernmental organizations of
being agents of imperialism, colonialism, or western-
ization. As can be easily seen, this description fits the
cultural relativism that is often used as an argument
by the representatives of a few Asian and Islamic coun-
tries.14 In keeping with this rhetoric, the government uses
this phase as an opportunity to increase domestic re-
pression even more. This is confirmed by empirical evi-
dence which shows that the human rights situation can
get worse, although public opinion has already been
alerted. The important thing, however, is that the re-
pressive government’s rhetorical defence amounts to
taking part in a process of communication that is hard
to cut off again. In other words, even denying the valid-
ity of human rights norms is a form of dealing with them.
Phase 3: 
Tactical Concessions and Self-Entanglement
The phase of denying the validity of human rights norms
is followed by a phase characterized by the government
making tactical concessions and getting more and
more entangled in its own arguments. Substantively,
this phase is marked by the increasing cooperation of
national and international human rights networks and
their intensifying contacts with donors, international
human rights institutions and the international com-
munity. These developments act as a constraint on the
repressive regime’s ability to choose its course of 
action. The intense external pressure in the form of
threats and sanctions heightens the opposition’s sense
of being protected. It loses its fear of the repressive
government and tries to influence the country’s popu-
lation more and more actively, which in turn increases
the pressure within the political system.15 The govern-
ment then makes some tactical concessions concern-
ing the validity of human rights. Given the right circum-
stances, it may even set up its own human rights
institutions. In the short term, this development serves
to ease tensions. In the long term, however, it strength-
ens the opposition, which can now voice its criticism
and its interests even more forcefully. Whereas in phase
two the dynamics for change are set in motion by in-
ternational public opinion, they now arise from within
the centre of the countries violating human rights
norms. In phase three, governments have two options:
controlled liberalization or continued repression. The
latter, however, merely leads to another round of
strengthening the opposition and increasing the pres-
sure exerted by even greater mobilization efforts on the
part of transnational networks, which in the end also
brings about controlled liberalization.
During this phase public discourse no longer focuses on
the question of the validity of human rights norms as
such but on the specific charge that human rights
14 Tomacˇevski (2000), 158ff. provides some eloquent examples of how representatives of the Iranian government used this line
of argument in the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 1980s; Amarsaikhan
(2003), 10-48 cites examples taken from the discourse on Asian values. Cf. Würth (2003) on the question of whether and
how culture-specific arguments can be employed in the context of the discourse on human rights.
15 Based on a quantitative and comparative analysis, Foweraker / Landman (1997) show that popular mobilization is the 
prerequisite for successful claims to citizenship rights. 
norms are being violated. The conflict between the
government and the opposition actually starts to turn
into a kind of court trial, with both parties trying to win
over international public opinion by using appropriate
arguments. By conceding the validity of human rights
norms for purely tactical reasons, the regime gets itself
more and more entangled in a process from which it will
not be able to disentangle itself in the long run. The
government’s own acknowledgement of the legitimacy
of human rights can now be increasingly used by the
population stipulating their implementation.
Phase 4: 
Status of recognition
The fourth phase of the “spiral model” describes the de-
velopment to a continuous recognition of human rights
norms (“prescriptive status”) that can be used as a
reference point. For this to happen, it is not enough for
the government to sign on to human rights. Rather, it
will also institutionalize and implement them as na-
tional law. The validity of human rights is confirmed by
the government in as natural a way as possible and
without taking into consideration the type and com-
position of the audience. In addition, the government
will visibly make a long-term effort to actually comply
with human rights conventions.
Phase 5: 
Norm consistent behaviour
Sustainable changes depend on continuous local and
international mobilization even after the establish-
ment of the norms’ prescriptive status. Not least be-
cause of selective reporting by the media, international
attention has often abated in the past, especially when
a change of government had occurred. The prosecution
of earlier human rights violations by the legal system
in cooperation with the United Nations and the Inter-
national Criminal Court helps to maintain the world’s
attention and to prevent the international community
from losing interest in the country. Efforts to enhance
the population’s knowledge and awareness of human
rights, especially by human rights education and the
institutionalization of the rule of law, are of prime 
importance during this phase. 
Discourse matters is thus the conclusion of the “spiral
model”. The discourse on human rights requires a cer-
tain degree of publicity while at the same time it helps
generate such publicity. Human rights discourse en-
tangles governments, with few options for long-term
disentanglement. As far as the strategies and instru-
ments of human rights policy are concerned, the fol-
lowing can be inferred from the “spiral model”: 
The objectives that governments might consider try-
ing to achieve in human rights dialogues also depend
on the phase a potential dialogue partner is in at the
time. In most cases, the potential partners for a hu-
man rights dialogue will be countries going through
phases two, three or four. In order to identify the 
various phases correctly, it is necessary to observe the
potential partner countries very closely and to 
develop a country- and phase-specific strategy. 
International pressure, for example from bodies of the
United Nations, is a particularly important instrument
in the first and second phases, even if it cannot al-
ways counteract human rights violations directly.
But without international mobilization, it is impossi-
ble to strengthen a country’s domestic opposition,
which, according to the “spiral model”, is the precon-
dition for change.
Instruments organized as dialogues, such as Technical
Cooperation for the promotion of human rights or
dialogues of governments, are in certain political
situations the more appropriate and effective instru-
ment than pressure by resolutions. But, as a matter
of fact, the potential of the various instruments de-
pends on the phase that the regime and the oppo-
sition are going through.
Discourse and practice matter – equally – this may be
the short-hand summary of the preceding discussion
about the impact of human rights norms. In the context
of human rights dialogues – and criticism thereof – im-
provements in the normative environment should there-
fore not be played off against a reduction in human
rights violations. Positive changes in both areas should
be promoted and acknowledged.
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In this chapter, the insights gained above are applied
to the planning of human rights dialogues. Section 2.1
will introduce the basics of assessing the starting point
for human rights dialogues, while section 2.2 deals
with possible goals for human rights dialogues. Section
2.3 elaborates on strategies, and lastly, differentiated
planning procedures will be discussed in section 2.4. 
2.1 Situation Analysis 
The starting point for a gender-sensitive human rights
analysis consists of three aspects of a government’s
obligations: the obligation to respect, the obligation to
protect, and the obligation to fulfil human rights.16
Based on this understanding, a government’s obligations
and the degree of their fulfilment can be outlined and
the various duty-bearers and right-holders be identified.
In addition, it should be examined whether governments
meet their obligations in a non-discriminatory way –
for example, when elementary education is legally re-
quired but actually not enforced for girls or refugees.
Besides using the three-pronged obligation as the 
basis of analysis, any appraisal of the human rights 
situation must also utilize international reference 
material, and if they exist, the Concluding Observations
of the United Nations treaty bodies that monitor the
implementation of human rights conventions, as well
as the recommendations of United Nations special 
rapporteurs on certain topics or countries.
For one thing, this follows from the necessity to assess
a country’s actual practice of implementation. For 
another, it is important to tie in with already existing
discourses so as to exploit this as a strategic advantage.
What is more, state reports to the treaty bodies and
their Concluding Observations provide information for
the general public that can be actively referred to by
transnational and local non-governmental organiza-
tions.17 Not all Concluding Observations by treaty 
bodies are equally helpful. The credibility of human
rights policy, however, suffers considerably if the sub-
stantive and country-specific work of United Nations
bodies is ignored, while at the same time countries are
exhorted to cooperate with these very bodies.18
In addition, there are numerous other sources that can
be used for analyzing a country’s human rights situa-
tion, such as country reports of human rights organi-
zations or institutions, reports of international donors,
and so on. A situation analysis should facilitate a 
deeper understanding of current problems that also
takes into account an analysis of the causes of human
rights abuses. The “spiral model” allows understanding
such situations within their local context. 
2 
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16 The three-pronged obligation supersedes the older notion that political and civil rights are characterized by omissions, 
whereas economic, social and cultural rights are characterized by positive provisions, goods or services; see Riedel (2004),
169-170.
17 A project of the University of Berne under the supervision of Walter Kälin is currently converting the Concluding Observations,
as well as the recommendations of United Nations special rapporteurs and other UN sources, into a database. Once completed,
this resource will greatly facilitate the work of all institutions involved in the promotion of human rights.
18 In the 1990s, human rights dialogues were largely characterized by giving little heed to the treaty bodies as well as to special
rapporteurs. Even today this problem persists in Technical Cooperation programmes of many bilateral donors (see Woodman
2004), and even where one would least expect it, namely in the Technical Cooperation programmes of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Here are the critical remarks of a 2003 evaluation report: “The relation-
ship between OHCHR [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] Technical Cooperation programmes and treaty
bodies and special procedures seems to be a one-way street: emphasis on treaty body reporting and the role and relevance
of the special procedures in Technical Cooperation activities, but no or hardly any attention to recommendations in the design
and implementation of Technical Cooperation activities on relevant thematic issues or countries.” Flinterman / Zwamborn
(2003), 62.
2.2 Setting Goals
As a matter of principle, the goals of a dialogue must
always be determined in negotiation with the partner
country and agreed on by both sides. Goals can be set
on different levels. These are not organized hierarchic-
ally. Instead, they run parallel to each other. Thus, goals
on different levels can be combined with each other.
Figure 1 Levels for goals in human rights dialogues 
or human rights promotion 
This division of goals is based on several considerations:
The attributability of effects: To establish a causal link
between human rights dialogues and any visible
change is notoriously hard. While potentially possible
on level 1 and 2, it should be very difficult at level 4. 
Impact: Impact is much more likely at levels 1 and
2 than at levels 3 and 4. Given planning cycles of
three to four years, it would seem rather unrealistic
to expect an impact at all levels.
Linking cause and effect: Many projects for the pro-
motion of human rights start from the implicit or
explicit assumption that impact at levels 1 and 2 will
cause changes at levels 3 and 4 in the long run. As
shown above (see section 1.1), this assumption can-
not be confirmed empirically. What is more, human
rights violations are always caused by the actions, or
the failure to act, of persons, groups of persons or
institutions. For the time being, the ratification of
treaties, or a corresponding legislative act, can at
least improve the possibility to identify violations as
such. Only in the long term there might be any pre-
ventive effects. Accordingly, the causes of human
rights abuses cannot be removed by either the rati-
fication of human rights conventions or the passage
of legislative acts alone. 
A linkage of cause and effect will probably exist 
between human rights policy and the permanent 
institutionalization and guarantee of human rights.
Thus, it makes sense for human rights dialogues and
concomitant Technical Cooperation activities to 
focus on changes in specific human rights policies,
or in other words, to pursue goals at level 3.
Overall, this distinction between levels for goal setting
is a plea for an approach to the planning of human rights
dialogues (and Technical Cooperation activities) that is
clear and transparent, and above all, modest and realistic. 
2.3 Strategy Development 
and Coordination
The development of human rights strategies is based on
the assessment of the human rights situation. It is in-
dispensable both for human rights dialogues and for
measures aimed at the promotion of human rights.19 It
includes an appraisal of one’s own position and the poli-
tical context, as well as of the phase that the partner
country is going through with regard to its approach
to human rights norms. Moreover, it is necessary to
evaluate the topics, actors and partners, as well as the
successes and failures of previously used human rights
instruments. Another necessary component of human
rights strategies is the coordination with other bilat-
eral and multilateral policies and actors. The following
paragraphs will look at some of the numerous impor-
tant strategic considerations.
The various actors involved in human rights dialogues
must be assessed strategically. What are the motives
and the expectations behind the partner country’s de-
cision to enter into a dialogue, and what are those of
the various partner institutions participating in Tech-
nical Cooperation programmes? In this context, it is
much less important for the partners’ expectations to
be identical. In certain political phases it is impossible
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19 See Woodman (2004). She deplores the lack of such strategies in projects to promote the rule of law in China. Similar criticism
has been voiced by the International Council for Human Rights Policy (2000).
Level Goals
Level 1 Ratifications, including consideration of 
reservations to treaties and acceptance of
individual complaints mechanisms
Level 2 Legislation of human rights in national 
constitution and legislation 
Level 3 Implementation of human rights treaties
and national legislation by local institutions
and policies 
Level 4 Permanent guarantees for human rights: 
reduction of the number of violations; 
mandate and functioning of governmental
and non-governmental human rights
institutions/organisations; functioning of
mechanisms for redress 
to assume as much anyway. Rather, it is important for
each partner to be able to have a clear sense of what
the other partner’s expectations are.
The second question concerns the degree of involve-
ment of the various partners and actors in existing
human rights abuses and human rights protection
respectively. Workshops with academic experts con-
tribute to the discourse if the results are diffused 
widely. By contrast, expert meetings with decision-
makers from the justice sector are characterized by rela-
tive proximity to human rights violations and are there-
fore important, depending on the goals of the dialogue.
At first, debates with this group may often amount to
no more than deductivist assertions such that, for in-
stance, cultural or religious prohibitions of torture are
taken as proof that such a practice cannot exist in
reality. But this is exactly why such groups must be 
approached continuously by offering them talks with
working groups made up of functionally equivalent
experts who are also well versed in the region’s affairs.
The evaluation of the partners will also help choose the
topics and instruments for the dialogue. Do relevant
partners in a dialogue categorically deny the normative
validity of human rights obligations, as described in
phase two of the “spiral model”? If so, the offer of Tech-
nical Cooperation programmes for the promotion of hu-
man rights will not be of interest to a partner country.
A dialogue on the current state of human rights would
not seem to be a wise move either.
Instead, it appears to make more sense under such
conditions of phase two to hold workshops on the
theological and philosophical approaches to human
rights norms in various traditions. In doing so, however,
it is important not to let the proponents of cultural rela-
tivism establish a foothold in the debate by arguing that
some traditions can be invoked as a legitimate argu-
ment to undermine the validity of human rights.
Or do the partner countries acknowledge the validity
of human rights norms while denying certain violations
of the norms?20 In this case, it seems best to try for a
very intensive dialogue about those areas the partner
is willing to talk about. The vocabulary used in such
talks may be of a less provocative nature but still as pre-
cise as possible with regard to all relevant aspects of
human rights. For example, it might be useful to bring
up the concept of “human dignity” as a way to address
the issue of women’s rights.
The choice of topics for a dialogue must be by mutual
agreement in any case. It must therefore be assumed
that, from the point of view of both parties, the agenda
will feature topics that are determined by priorities 
other than those of one’s own side. They might include
economic, social and cultural rights or the right to de-
velopment.21 But they might also concern areas like
racism, religious freedom, or the handling of asylum and
migration, where, for example, many western countries
have human rights problems. Here, it is essential to be
as forthcoming in discussing one’s own problems as one
would expect the partners to be in discussing theirs, and
especially so in such sensitive areas as women’s rights.
A constructive contribution in this sense is the descript-
ion of the steps that have been and are being taken in
order to remedy the shortcomings of one’s own country.
In doing so, one can also proactively refer to one’s own
experience with the treaty bodies or corresponding re-
gional institutions for the protection of human rights.
Strategies must also take into consideration the usual
instruments of human rights policy and use them in 
accordance with the assessment of the phases described
above. If, for example, in phase two or three it is im-
possible to get civil society involved in the improvement
of the human rights situation, promotion of national ac-
tion plans and human rights institutions is not advis-
able because for both instruments to work it is necessa-
ry that representatives of civil society and government
can get involved in a common process and, if possible,
develop a common vision. In situations where the in-
volvement of civil society is possible and relatively
effective, but where the government’s capabilities are
limited, the promotion of national action plans or na-
tional human rights institutions does make sense,
though.22 In the long run, these government-spon-
sored national human rights institutions can become
important actors.
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20 Typical situations are those where the existence of political prisoners is denied or treated as taboo, while conditions in the
regular prison system can be discussed. Similar situations may arise when countries are unwilling to reform substantive
norms of their criminal law that indicate human rights violations (for example, the death penalty), even though they intend
to reform their code of criminal procedure.
21 This seems to be a concern that many are rightly suspicious of in those cases where serious violations of civil and political
rights can be observed in the partner country. But this suspicious mindset also reflects a Western understanding of human
rights, which – despite all the lip service paid to the indivisibility of human rights – de facto focused solely on civil and 
political rights for a long time.
22 A good source on the work of National Human Rights Institutions: International Council for Human Rights Policy (2005).
Activities in connection with dialogues should be strate-
gically coordinated with one’s other programmes and
activities, as well as with those of other countries.23 To
be sure, there are multilateral forums, such as the
Commission on Human Rights or the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, where countries can exchange
information about their dialogues. More interesting,
though, are initiatives like the forums provided by the
Berne and the Brussels-Berne process for at least com-
municating about their dialogues with China and Iran
respectively. These forums should provide a basis for co-
ordinating strategies and goals.24 The coordination of
objectives and activities is equally important in Tech-
nical Cooperation programmes for the promotion of
human rights. A lack of coordination endangers the 
effectiveness of these projects and, what is more, it 
encourages the dialogue partner to play off one Tech-
nical Cooperation partner against the other.
To sum up, strategies are absolutely necessary for dia-
logues to be successful, and they are also the basis for
a solid partnership between the two sides in a dialogue.
Strategies comprise coordination, the assessment of
one’s own position, the partners, the possible topics and
the windows of opportunity, as well as an analysis of
the best way to pursue the goals of the dialogue.
2.4 Activities and Results
Human rights promotion and human rights dialogues
intervene in political processes that are hard to grasp
and often impossible to control. The high number of ex-
ternal factors makes it difficult to plan human rights
interventions. Also, human rights dialogues come with
a high risk of inertia and failure, in any case. In addi-
tion, there is the question of attributability, just as
with interventions by means of Technical Cooperation,
because changes depend on the political will to make
them, and the latter is always influenced by many fac-
tors. It is therefore far from easy to establish a causal
link between a dialogue and any changes that might 
occur, or, in other words, it is hard to know if the chan-
ges are the result of the dialogue. They may, after all,
have been caused by largely external factors (for exam-
ple, lobbying by transnational networks or the threat of
impending resolutions by the human rights bodies of
the United Nations). Alternatively, they may be the 
effects of internal factors, such as upcoming elections
and increasing economic or political vulnerability. It is
therefore all the more important to use planning pro-
cedures that allow the various possible factors, as well
as the risks, to be identified. At the same time, the goal
and objectives of the dialogue must be determined, and
the various activities as well as their expected results
must be specified. This should be done in such a way
as to make it possible to develop, already in the plan-
ning stage, appropriate methods for observing the dia-
logue’s effects.
In this connection, the planning for human rights dia-
logues and Technical Cooperation activities for human
rights may actually benefit from experience gained in
development cooperation by adopting the appropriate
planning procedures, above all the so-called project 
cycle management.25 This procedure starts with a 
thorough analysis of the situation that is both sector-
specific and gender-sensitive in order to identify possible
objectives of an intervention and its underlying logic,
as well as target groups and stakeholders.26
At the core of operations planning with the help of pro-
ject cycle management is the differentiation between
activities and their results. Results are permanent out-
comes for an intervention’s immediate target groups
(for example, the judiciary and prison staff), that is to
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23 The evaluation report on the Technical Cooperation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that
the programme’s activities were not sufficiently integrated with the other programmes of the United Nations: Flinterman /
Zwamborn (2003), 88. Already since the mid-1990s, there have been reports of similar findings with regard to the coordination
of various sponsors in the area of human rights and the integration of human rights promotion with developments in society
at large: Heinz (1994), 51. See also International Council for Human Rights Policy (2000) and Woodman (2004) on the insuf-
ficient coordination of donors and the consequences thereof: excessive support for certain institutions, above all in urban
centres, competition among donors for certain partners, donor-driven agendas of partner institutions. 
24 See DFA (2004), 22- 23.
25 For a detailed discussion of this approach see: EuropeAid (2001); on its usefulness for human rights promotion: SIDA (2000),
viii, xi; Andreassen / Sano (2004), 9, 10. For an opposing view see: Sørbø / Tostensen (2005), 41, 53. They deny the applicability
of this planning approach by arguing that it ignores the logic and dynamics of the political processes involved in the promo-
tion of human rights and democracy, and that it produces linear assumptions about cause and effect. The authors do not,
however, offer a convincing alternative.
26 On the requirements for a human rights situation analysis, see section 2.1 above.
say, they are qualitative results of activities and not the
activities themselves.27 By contrast, an overriding goal
describes a change that will benefit the whole popu-
lation, or at least a representative part of it (“improve-
ments in the situation of male and female prisoners”).
Figure 2 Activities and results for training interventions 
Without such a distinction between activities, results,
and goals, all the planning will amount to no more than
developing and mechanically carrying out activities
(“completed so and so many dialogue sessions”; “pub-
lished expert reports”; “provided so and so much fur-
ther education for judges”). It will not become clear,
however, what kind of results these activities are sup-
posed to produce, nor how they are connected to the
achievement of the overall goal.28 Furthermore, it
would be difficult to monitor the dialogue for quality.
As will be explained in the following chapter, it is not
possible to assess the impact or to evaluate the dialogue
without differentiating between activities and results.
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27 For human rights promotion in the context of Technical Cooperation, some authors propose different or additional distinctions
to be made between outputs and purposes. “Purpose” refers to the immediate benefits of an activity for the target group,
while “output” refers to goods and services delivered by the project. SIDA (2000), 13; EuropeAid (no year), 115; OECD (2002), 4.
This differentiation appears not to have been widely adopted in the literature on human rights: Andreassen / Sano (2004), 14;
Kapoor (1996), 5.
28 This is the main criticism that human rights dialogues, as well as projects for the promotion of human rights, are faced with
again and again: SIDA (2000), xi. A similar view is also clearly expressed by the authors of an evaluation report on the Tech-
nical Cooperation programme of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: “An overview of the evaluations of
the projects makes clear that they are focused on the activities carried out much less than on effects or results.” Flinterman/
Zwamborn (2003), 39-40.
Goal Improvement of prisoners’ 
situation
Possible Indicators Possible Data
Result Application and relevance 
of acquired knowledge and
techniques 
x % of trainees apply the 
acquired knowledge/techni-
ques in their daily work 
routines; x % of trainees 
are promoted in x number of
years 
Post-training survey 
Activities Training for prison wards 
and administrators 
Number of trainees; ethnic
(and/or social, gender, gene-
rational) composition of
trainees; position of trainees 
Pre- and Post-training 
survey 
This chapter will focus on different forms of measuring
the impact of human rights dialogues. Impact assess-
ment is an essential precondition for transparency and
credibility, but also for the partners’ ability to learn. In
section 3.1 the terms for the various procedures of
measuring impact will be defined. Section 3.2 intro-
duces the different methods of measurement. The dis-
cussion takes up experiences from development coop-
eration, in so far as they can be fruitfully applied to
human rights dialogues and human rights promotion.
3.1 Forms of Impact Assessment
As a technical term, impact assessment is a generic
term that covers two procedures, impact monitoring
and evaluation.
Monitoring 
Impact monitoring is one of the instruments for con-
trolling projects and programmes. It builds on planning
procedures that allow activities and results to be moni-
tored and managed during implementation. Usually, im-
pact monitoring relies on qualitative and quantitative
indicators (for the terminology, see section 3.2.2).
Evaluation
Among other things, evaluation consists of analyzing
both the achievement of the goals and the sustained
nature of a project’s effects. Evaluation implies a double
look. First, the comparison of “before” and “after”, and
second, the comparison of what happens “with inter-
vention” and what happens “without intervention”.
Starting from the planning documents, an evaluation
is based on the results of periodic monitoring of the
achievement of indicators and benchmarks. An evalu-
ation then assesses the effectiveness of the chosen
instrument in relation to the achieved results. In other
words, evaluations assume the observation of effects
during an intervention. Overall, evaluations are very
complex and expensive.29
Ex post Observations
Ex post observations of a human rights situation must
be distinguished from these two technical forms of
impact assessment. Such observations are comparably
inexpensive, since they aim at assessing changes with
regard to the original situation. Sometimes changes in
the situation are attributed to the intervention though,
i.e. the human rights dialogue, without examining
whether it was the intervention that brought about the
result. This, of course, is not correct as the fact that the
ex post observation takes place after a human rights
dialogue does not prove a causal relationship.
To sum up, impact monitoring is one of the instruments
for managing and assessing interventions. Like evalua-
tions, it primarily looks at changes in the human rights
situation as well as the effectiveness of interventions
and the instruments employed. An ex post observation,
on the other hand, examines changes in the situation
but does not relate them to the effectiveness of the in-
struments. 
The following section will continue the theoretical dis-
cussion on impact assessment at the level of methods
and units of measurement. The section starts with a
short introduction on the debate concerning the mea-
surement of human rights performance.
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3.2 Methods of Measuring Impact
3.2.1 The Debate on the Quantitative 
Description of Human Rights Performance
So far, the reflections on measuring the impact of 
human rights dialogues have some shortcomings. They
have not sufficiently taken into account that impact 
assessment in the sense of impact monitoring and
evaluation requires a quantitative description of human
rights performance. There are several ways this short-
coming can be overcome. One approach is to use in-
ternational indices. Such indices compare countries
with respect to their legal provisions intended to pro-
tect human rights and with respect to actual violations
of these norms. Although this approach has been well
researched, it is in fact rather controversial. Mostly, such
indices are developed and used by political scientists.
By correlating their data with variables like economic
development, system of government, and political cul-
ture, these scholars try to demonstrate what boosts the
ratification and implementation of human rights con-
ventions on the one hand, or the occurrence of human
rights violations on the other.30 In development cooper-
ation, such indices are used politically, in order to mea-
sure the performance of governments and to allocate
funds accordingly. As a matter of principle, human
rights experts view these indices rather critically.  Such
indices have not yet been used for measuring the ef-
fectiveness of human rights dialogues.31
Independently of the controversy around indices, 
another discussion relates to the use of indicators and
benchmarking in human rights work and scholarship.
Even though both debates deal with the quantitative
description of human rights performance, their goals
and objectives are different. As used by the treaty 
bodies, benchmarks and indicators are intended to faci-
litate monitoring of human rights treaties compliance
and the cooperation with ratifying states.32 In the context
of development cooperation their purpose is to monitor
and evaluate the impact of human rights promotion.33
All in all, no consensus has as yet emerged concerning
the question whether and how human rights perfor-
mance can be described by quantitative methods.34
But at least everybody agrees that basic conceptual
work is necessary before such a quantitative descrip-
tion of human rights performance can be attempt-
ed.35 Accordingly, there is no generally accepted set of
human rights indicators or benchmarks that might be
applied to human rights dialogues. Most of the indi-
cators used in connection with human rights promo-
tion have been developed in programmes designed to
promote the rule of law or good governance. Fre-
quently, however, they are insufficiently disaggregated
by gender and region.36
3.2.2 Indices, Indicators and Benchmarks: 
Definitions, Scope, and Their Potential Uses
“There is currently considerable confusion over the
purpose, methodology, terminology and typology of
indicators”.37 This is how a 2002 study by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development starts.
Today, this statement still holds true. Criteria, bench-
marks, and indicators are often used colloquially, and
then as synonyms rather than as technical terms.38 In
the following paragraphs, these terms will therefore be
briefly defined, while their scope and potential uses will
be illustrated.
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30 The most pertinent contributions were made by Barsh (1993); Carey / Poe (2004); Foweraker / Landman (1997); Goldstein (1992);
Hathaway (2002); Keith (1999); Poe / Keith / Tate (1999); Poe / Tate (1994).
31 See Tomacˇevski (1989), 50-53 and United Nations, General Assembly (1993), para 148.
32 Scheinin (2005); Report of Turku Expert Meeting on Human Rights Indicators (2005), 7-9.
33 As donors increasingly adopt rights-based approaches in development, they will have to give more thought to the question
of how these approaches can be operationalized, and how their successes can be monitored.
34 See the debate in the 1990s: United Nations, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(1990); United Nations, General Assembly (1993).
35 Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 24; in the same vein, Landman (2005) and Thede (2001).
36 A good overview can be found in Vera Institute for Justice (2003); see also: Kapoor (1996), 23-29. For gender-related data,
see: http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/   and   http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/gdmis.do.
37 OECD (2002), 3. A summary of the United Nations debates and documents from the 1990s can be found in United Nations,
Secretary-General (1999), para 16.
38 Kirby, for example, speaks of indicators, but then goes on to describe benchmarks. Green, on the other hand, carefully distin-
guishes between these terms (2001), 1080: “In brief, benchmarks can be defined as goals or targets that are specific to the
individual circumstances of each country. As opposed to human rights indicators, which measure human rights observation
or enjoyment in absolute terms, human rights benchmarks measure performance relative to individually defined standards”
(italics in the original).
Indices
Indices are highly aggregated composites of various sta-
tistical data. They are expressed as scales, numerical
values or qualitative terms. The best-known indices
are the Freedom House Index and the Human Develop-
ment Index. Both are used by academics and develop-
ment practitioners. 
Qualitative Benchmarks
Qualitative benchmarks are concrete, normative stand-
ards or criteria that the current situation is compared
to. “Minorities’ access to the law” or “equal opportu-
nity for women in the job market” are examples of such
benchmarks. Often they are used in the form of yes-or-
no checklists, for instance, when the ratification of
human rights conventions or their implementation in
constitutions and legislation must be documented. Pri-
marily, qualitative benchmarks are currently used for
documenting human rights violations (see section
4.3.1.2 below).
Performance Benchmarks 
Qualitative benchmarks must be distinguished from
what could be called quantitative benchmarks, but in
the literature is referred to as performance bench-
marks. These latter set a target pegged to a deadline,
for example, “the reduction of illiteracy rates of rural
women between 15 and 24 years of age by so and so
many percentage points by 2008”, or “release of 50 po-
litical prisoners by the end of 2005”. Performance
benchmarks are thus concrete targets that have been
specified at an institutional, regional, national or in-
ternational level. Performance benchmarks are mainly
used in connection with reforms of administrative
agencies and institutions.39 Currently, the most promi-
nent examples of performance benchmarks are the
Millennium Development Goals.40 This type of bench-
marking depends on qualitative information about cur-
rent policies and their results. For the examples men-
tioned above, this means that there must be reliable and
up-to-date statistics on illiterate women from various
age groups and regions, as well as data on the appro-
ximate total number of political prisoners. For moni-
toring the overall human rights situation, performance
benchmarks can be used if they are linked to indicators.
Thus, the prisoner benchmark can measure whether the
agreed number of prisoners has indeed been released,
while an indicator (“total number of political prisoners”)
will reveal whether new political prisoners were de-
tained during the same time.
Performance benchmarks are very useful for monitoring
human rights dialogues or Technical Cooperation ac-
tivities that aim to improve specific policies in human
rights relevant sectors or the services of certain insti-
tutions. If complex objectives are to be monitored by
performance benchmarks they must be linked to indi-
cators.
Indicators, Especially Human Rights Indicators
Here, indicators shall refer to those measurement units
that can be used to determine the extent of changes
directly or indirectly as well as multi-dimensionally, or
in other words, with regard to their absolute occurrence,
quality and scope.
In social science literature, indicators are required to be,
among other things, specific, relevant and sensitive
enough to register even short-term changes. There are
three different kinds of indicators: quantitative, quali-
tative, and participatory. Quantitative indicators are
derived from data collected by statistical methods.
Qualitative indicators are based on survey results, such
as questionnaires (see section 3.3 on data collection).41
Participatory indicators are those measurement units,
whether quantitative or qualitative, that have been
jointly developed with target groups, partners or stake-
holders.42 
A number of proposals have been made on how best to
conceptualize indicators designed specifically for hu-
man rights purposes.43 A few authors have tried to
use the three-pronged state obligation to respect, to
protect and to fulfil human rights. Accordingly, they
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39 See Audit Commission (2000); Audit Commission (2000a); see also UNDP (2000), 99 for examples of the use of benchmarks
in development cooperation.
40 For the indicators gathered in connection with this benchmarking process, as well as their application to human rights, see
United Nations, Secretary-General (2004), Annex 5 and United Nations, Economic and Social Council (2003).
41 See Kapoor (1996), 7-9; International Council for Human Rights Policy (2005), 26-27. 
42 For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the various kinds of indicators in the work of national 
human rights institutions, see International Council for Human Rights policy (2005), 26-29.
43 Overviews of these proposals are provided by Malhotra / Fasel (2005); report of Turku Expert Meeting on Human Rights 
Indicators (2005); Landman / Häusermann (2003). So far, however, no one has come up with a comprehensive and well-
tested set of such indicators.
have suggested indicators for the respect of human
rights norms (e.g. number of cases of ill treatment in
detention), for the protection of human rights (e.g.
effective protection for the victims of domestic vio-
lence), as well as for the fulfilment of human rights (e.g.
school enrolment rates, etc.).44 Others group indicators
into those for human rights-related results (occur-
rence of violations, extent of guarantees) and those for
human rights-related processes. The latter are to 
measure how the government lives up to its obligation
to comply with the norms and to fulfil the various
rights, for example, with regard to non-discrimination
and the possibilities of redress.45 Such indicators would
therefore measure the support for vulnerable groups in
various policy areas, as well as the establishment of
agencies or mechanisms for filing complaints, and the
scope of their remit.
In principle, solidly developed indicators can be used to
describe and measure changes in the human rights
situation, as well as in the policies pursued in those 
sectors that are relevant for human rights. Indicators
can be used as the only basis for monitoring or in com-
bination with other measurement units. All in all, indi-
cators may be used for monitoring and managing com-
plex human rights dialogues, and evaluating their impact. 
Common Characteristics of 
Performance Benchmarks and Indicators
Performance benchmarks and indicators share many
characteristics. They can be used for measuring the
achievement of project objectives, results, and activi-
ties. It is therefore necessary to develop them during the
planning stage of a dialogue, as well as to continuously
adjust them during the actual conduct of the dia-
logue.46 Furthermore, their formulation requires data
that reflect the actual state of affairs. Accordingly, the
sustainable gathering of data by institutions in the
partner country should be one of the objectives of the
dialogue or the Technical Cooperation programme. An
appropriate period of time must be scheduled for this
purpose, and adequate funding must be provided for in
the budget. One last common characteristic is shared
by all units of measurements used in impact assess-
ments. Projects and institutions must not overextend
themselves by trying to meet too many benchmarks or
indicators, or by choosing unrealistically ambitious
ones. They should measure only things that are relevant,
achievable, and measurable at justifiable cost in time,
money and effort. Otherwise, the attention of everybody
involved will shift from substantive goals and results to
their measurability.47
3.3 Mechanisms for Gathering Data:
Strengths and Weaknesses
Sources and methods of data collection are central to
all debates on the quantitative description of human
rights-related performance. However, data collection is
also essential for monitoring the impact of human
rights dialogues and for evaluating them, as well as for
human rights promotion since any measurement of
change requires base line data. As a matter of princi-
ple, gathering this type of data is a responsibility of the
partner country. As such, data collection should be a
separate and independent objective of any human
rights dialogue.
The common mechanisms for collecting data consist of:
survey results of various types, primarily aimed at
qualitatively assessing the human rights situation
(representative surveys of opinions or perceptions,
household surveys, entry or exit polls for clients of
institutions);
data on human rights violations that are derived
from the observation of national events (events-
based monitoring), for example, the country reports
by human rights organizations like amnesty inter-
national and Human Rights Watch;
data on the human rights situation and on human
rights abuses that are based on assessing the situa-
tion with a view to certain standards or criteria
(standard-based monitoring), such as those stipulated
by treaties, agreements, certain guidelines, or con-
ference resolutions of the United Nations;
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44 For example, Malhotra / Fasel (2005a).
45 For example, the proposal by Green (2001) and Landman (2004) and (2005). 
46 “[I]n some senses, the search for appropriate … indicators is itself an indicator of deficiencies at the planning stages of the
project.” This is how a group of evaluation experts sums up this fact: SIDA (2000), 114. Kapoor (1996), 5 argues that indi-
cators can be useful instruments only if they are developed during the planning phase.
47 On this point, there is general agreement in the literature: Vera Institute (2003), 4, 13; Kapoor (1996), 13; Audit Commission
(2000), 8.
national or international socio-economic statistics,
preferably disaggregated according to criteria such
as gender etc.48 
Many institutions insist on using quantitative data as
a basis for impact assessment.49 However, with regard
to human rights work, this seems to be overly ambitious,
given the limited availability of data and the general
difficulty to quantify human rights performance. At
the same time, it also seems to underestimate the rel-
evance of qualitative data. Instead of attempting such
categorical evaluations, the following paragraphs will
therefore present a brief description of the strengths,
weaknesses, and costs of the various mechanisms.
Up-to-date and reliable socio-economic statistics, such
as those that form the basis for the Human Develop-
ment Index, are not available for many countries. And
even the ones that do exist are often insufficiently
disaggregated by gender, age, region, etc.50 On the one
hand, this makes it difficult to use these kinds of data
for human rights work. On the other hand, there is no
use in waiting for the availability of tailor-made human
rights statistics. Instead, data that can be used should
be used.51 And what is more, this situation presents a
great potential for the future, especially for the treaty
bodies. By cooperating with the United Nations Sta-
tistics Division, the treaty bodies can help revise the re-
quirements for the socio-economic data collected by
countries in such a way as to facilitate their applica-
bility to human rights issues.52
Different challenges arise from the collection of data
that are generated when national events are observed –
for example, elections or the intervention of security
forces in demonstrations or civil wars. This kind of
monitoring focuses on the systematic and most egre-
gious human rights abuses. If, for instance, torture is
used systematically in a civil war, simultaneous violat-
ions of economic rights by state and non-state actors
may not be documented the same way.53 This weakness
can be partially overcome by combining events-based
and standards-based monitoring. Thus, all events and
developments that are relevant for human rights are al-
ways covered. This kind of comprehensive monitoring
is indeed very demanding, but especially for interna-
tional human rights organizations and national human
rights institutions there simply is no alternative. Orga-
nizations should disclose the method of monitoring
they use, while the reporting formats should be stand-
ardized as much as possible.54
Surveys, on the other hand, mostly produce qualitative
data. Surveys are very feasible in training programmes
if the participants, as the immediate target group, can
be interviewed directly (for example by means of entry
or exit polls). Surveys can be very expensive, however,
if, for instance, the evaluation of Technical Cooperation
activities requires that indirect target groups, or in
other words, a representative share of the population,
need to be included in order to check whether the
overall objective has been achieved.
In sum, it can be said that all mechanisms for gathering
data on the situation and development of human rights
have undeniable strengths with regard to their meaning-
fulness, but also certain weaknesses as far as their
costs and practicability are concerned. In the develop-
ment of indicators and benchmarks the following points
must be taken into consideration: What is the basis of
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48 A good overview of the methods of human rights monitoring is provided by: Guzmann / Verstappen (2003), 25f.; on the
collection of data: Landman / Häusermann (2003), 4; UNDP (2004), 6ff.; Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 5-22.
49 See, for example, Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 7. Their main intention is to prevent subjective factors from influencing the 
evaluation of the data.
50 See United Nations, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1990), para 8, 27-28;
UNDP also concedes that the Human Development Index does not yield much information for human rights-related questions:
UNDP (2000), 108.
51 This is expressed quite clearly by Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 25: “… in most cases, the possibility of using the available infor-
mation on the socio-economic indicators … at the international, national and sub-national level for use as human rights 
indicators has not been adequately explored.” See also: United Nations, Secretary-General (2004), Annex 4 on the revised
requirements for reporting to the treaty bodies.
52 See United Nations, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1990), para 10 for the
situation at the beginning of the 1990s; for information on more recent efforts, see United Nations, Economic and Social
Council (2003a); Report of Turku Expert Meeting on Human Rights Indicators (2005), 9; Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 10-18.
53 The processing of such data also raises some methodological issues. Thus, the quantitative documentation of human rights
violations requires a decision as to exactly which human rights-related aspects of an event are to be recorded – all of them
or just the most serious one. If, for example, persons were tortured they are also likely to have been arrested illegally. In 
addition, numerous other rights have usually been violated as well. Should these abuses be recorded or just the peak of the
event, in other words the torture? The portrayal of the human rights situation will look quite different, depending on the 
approach that is finally adopted. See Cingranelli / Richards (2004), 6; Poe / Keith / Tate (1999), 298.
54 An important step in this direction was the development of standardized reporting formats for human rights violations by
Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems (HURIDOCS).
the data? How can the partner country’s institutions
collect data that are current and reliable, and how can
they do so in a sustainable manner? It should therefore
be a central goal and topic of human rights dialogues
to exchange views with partner countries concerning
the collection of data on human rights-related facts, as
well as to support these countries with regard to
collection of relevant data.
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The focus of the following chapter will be various
forms of impact assessment for human rights dia-
logues. The first part 4.1 introduces methods for impact
assessment for dialogues where improvements in the
normative environment of the partner country are en-
visaged. Section 4.2 takes a look at dialogues that are
intended to change specific human rights policies. 
Section 4.3 finally deals with the possibilities of mea-
suring the impact of those dialogues that aim at im-
proving the overall human rights situation.
Three models, one for each of the three kinds of goal
pursued in human rights dialogues, will be developed
here. These models are not intended to be understood
as evaluations of past or current dialogues. 
4.1 Dialogue Model: 
Changes on the Normative Level
Human rights dialogues can try to improve a country’s
willingness to ratify human rights conventions or to im-
plement them into national law. In such dialogues the
first objective must usually be to convince the partner
country’s representatives of the relevance and univer-
sal validity of human rights. This requires precise know-
ledge of the country’s legal and political reservations
to the human rights system of the United Nations or the
region. It is also important to understand those debates
in the partner country that criticize the values and
rights embodied in human rights treaties as culturally
or religiously irrelevant or as threatening to national
identity. Such a dialogue should therefore include,
among other things, a detailed discussion of the two
countries’ various historical and political experiences
with the recognition of human rights norms. It should
also provide a forum where cultural, religious and poli-
tical reservations regarding human rights norms can be
voiced, discussed and dealt with. Depending on the
political system, the target groups for such a dialogue
can be members of parliament as well as experts from
academia and the legal profession , but also representa-
tives of the justice and foreign ministries. At the same
time, it is necessary to continuously include those
forces critical of human rights, for example by means
of joint working groups of experts holding functionally
equivalent positions. Depending on the political situ-
ation in the country, cooperation with civil society
groups may boost the domestic lobby for the ratifica-
tion of conventions and their national implementation
(see section 1.2 above).
What are the methods and units of measurement that
the partners can utilize to assess the impact of dia-
logues with such a goal?
4.1.1 Impact Assessment Based on Indices
A number of studies by political scientists use indices
in order to document the development of the inter-
national status of ratifications quantitatively, while
others use them to measure the implementation of
essential human rights in constitutional guarantees or
legislative acts.55 Above all, these indices are interest-
ing for ex post analyses of dialogues. They can show the
phases during which the partner country took steps to-
wards implementation, but also how developments in the
partner country compare to those in other countries. 
An index on the normative situation in countries has
been developed by Hans-Otto Sano and Lore Lindholt
as part of their project called Human Rights Indicators
at the Danish Human Rights Institute. They measure the
normative environment (formal commitment) by aggre-
gating four components:
ratification of fundamental international and re-
gional human rights instruments;
ratification of other conventions of the United Nations;
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55 Landman (2004), 912, 914, 915 and Foweraker / Landman (1997) have done the most extensive research in this respect. 
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reservations to conventions of the United Nations or
the region;
existence of a national Bill of Rights.56 
They depict this normative environment on a scale
from zero (strong formal commitment) to eight (no
formal commitment), and analyse their results with
respect to regions. As a result, only East and South East
Asia, as well as South Asia, show an intermediate
commitment, while all other regions show a strong
commitment. This index can be used for ex ante and ex
post analyses of the normative environment. However,
because of the (as yet) short time span it covers, it is
not particularly meaningful. For measuring impact in
the technical sense, other methods, especially bench-
marks, are more widely used and more appropriate.
They will be described in the following sections.
4.1.2 Impact Assessment Based on 
Qualitative Benchmarks
The partners can use qualitative benchmarks as a
checklist in order to see if the country’s constitution and
laws guarantee certain rights stipulated by the con-
ventions. Basically, this is similar to the way in which
most countries write their reports to the treaty bodies.
The respective articles of the conventions are juxta-
posed with the corresponding laws or regulations of the
country. Whether in this form, or in the form of quali-
tative benchmarks, these methods document the cur-
rent status at a certain point in time. With qualitative
benchmarks, the partners can therefore examine the le-
gal situation ex post facto and can determine whether
any changes occurred after the dialogue. To monitor these
changes, though, qualitative benchmarks must be given
a dynamic dimension by placing them within a time frame. 
Figure 3 Qualitative benchmarks pegged to time frame
and complexity of task
Drastically simplified, such a timetable might look like
this:
Figure 4 Improving the normative environment: 
using qualitative benchmarks as results 
The advantage of arranging qualitative benchmarks in
this way is obvious: The partners can formulate them
relatively clearly and keep them manageable. The
arrangement of benchmarks within a time frame per-
mits partners to focus on the results of their activities.
The partners get a chance to control the success of the
dialogue and to exit if certain benchmarks are not met
by the date agreed. Measuring impact by following
this model is comparatively simple: it measures whether
legislative initiatives that may have been taken are
compatible with international standards in purely nor-
mative terms. It does not, however, measure the results
of the application of these laws which would be much
more complicated.
To sum up: Dynamic qualitative benchmarks permit
partners to monitor changes at the normative level
reasonably well and comparatively inexpensively. 
4.2 Dialogue Model: 
Changes in Human Rights Policies
Dialogues can try to bring about changes in human
rights specific policies. Such dialogues require that the
partners treat each other in a very cooperative way and
that they have at least similar expectations of the dia-
logue. According to this model then, the partners will
choose specific topics, such as the prevention of tor-
ture, relations with civil society, or abolishing the death
penalty. In connection with these topics, they will dis-
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56 Sano / Lindholt (2002), 5. The choice of the individual components of the index raises the question why and how “fundamental”
conventions are distinguished from “other” UN conventions. Another problem is the insufficient distinction between procedural
and substantive reservations. Also, it remains unclear why the acceptance of mechanisms for filing individual complaints is
not part of the index.
Complexity of legislation to be reformed
time frame
Time Frame Benchmark
12-24 months Access to material and relevant actors is
granted; base line studies are completed
24 months First draft based on international 
standard is presented
36 months Time table to pass the law is completed
48 months Legislation is passed 
cuss certain policies, for example, the issue of how to
deal with complaints about torture and abuse, the
relations between government and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), or the review processes with 
respect to death sentences. With this approach, the 
normative environment will, of course, also be taken
into account. Primarily, however, the focus will be on
institutions that apply existing laws and regulations. The
common objective of changing policies makes it 
necessary to involve target groups that implement and
execute the respective policies. With regard to the
prevention of torture, these target groups include se-
curity forces, police, experts on forensic medicine, and
prosecutors. In addition, they include groups of persons
affected by these policies, such as victims’ or survivors’
associations, and human rights NGOs.
Such dialogues do not focus on culture-specific argu-
ments on human rights or their derivation and validity.
Instead, they are characterized by workshop-like, long-
term, and specialist debates on the current situation
and its ramifications, as well as by activities for capacity
building. Furthermore, it is important that the dia-
logue activities are not restricted to urban centres.
The sustainable gathering of data by partner institutions
must be an independent goal of such dialogues. The
following section examines methods for impact assess-
ment of this model of human rights dialogues. 
4.2.1 Impact Assessment Based on Benchmarks
Qualitative benchmarks can be used to check whether
a certain human rights-related policy has been adopt-
ed, for example, whether a national human rights in-
stitution has been established and given an appropri-
ate mandate.57 Qualitative benchmarks are, however,
hardly suitable for observing how well, or how poorly,
the institution functions with regard to its mandate. But
measuring changes in human rights policies implies
both: the question of the existence as well as the per-
formance of certain policies.58 Because the latter is a
dynamic process, it is better captured by performance
benchmarks and indicators.
Figure 5 Using performance benchmarks to improve 
the situation of prisoners 
Performance benchmarks are specific targets that have
been agreed on at the institutional, regional, national,
or international level. They are designed for the respec-
tive policies and the bodies in charge of them. Similar
to indicators, they can measure performance levels by
measuring the quantitative and qualitative differences
between the target stipulated and the actual state of
affairs. Figure 5 above illustrates the use of performance
benchmarks. In order to measure the degree to which
the overall goal has been achieved (“improving the
situation of prisoners”), these targets can also be linked
to indicators. Possible indicators might be the following:
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57 See International Council for Human Rights Policy (2005), 8: “Benchmarks are standards that define the minimum attributes
of national institutions with respect to their legal foundation, membership, mandate, funding and so on. National institutions
should meet such benchmarks because, if well-defined, they will determine whether or not the institution is in a position to
achieve its fundamental purpose which is to promote and protect human rights effectively, as well as more specific programme
objectives.” (Italics in the original).
58 This is not to suggest that human rights policies can, or should, not be measured with regard to other criteria, such as their
efficiency.
Goal Improvement of the situation of male and
female prisoners 
Target groups Ministries for the Interior and Justice; 
judiciary; prosecutors; prison adminis-
trations, at central and regional levels
Activities Political dialogue; expert meetings and
workshops; technical cooperation, with
components in training and information
management.
Results Access to and quality of water, sanitation,
nutrition, health care are improved; 
Pre-trial detainees and convicts are 
separated;
Overcrowding is reduced;
Access to complaint mechanisms is 
improved. 
Performance
benchmarks
X % of male and female prisoners have
access to specified benefits until the end
of 2005; 
X + 1 % of male and female prisoners
have access to specified benefits until 
the end of 2006; 
Reduction of prison-related infectious 
diseases by x % at the end of 2005 etc. 
In x % of all well-founded complaints
submitted by prisoners, those responsible
were held accountable by the end of
2005 etc.
total number of prisoners relative to a) prison staff,
and b) prison cells that conform to international
standards;
share of the funds allocated for prisons earmarked for
equipping them according to international stan-
dards;
access to meaningful information about the filing of
complaints;
the time it takes from the filing of a complaint to a
decision concerning this complaint.59
Thus, changes in policies and services of certain insti-
tutions can be measured quite well with the help of per-
formance benchmarks, whether with or without
additional indicators. 
The advantage of performance benchmarks is their
specificity, which makes disagreements about their in-
terpretation less likely. This is very different in the case
of qualitative objectives or quantitative indicators. For
example, the objective “improving the capacity of
government agencies to deal with human rights com-
plaints” or an indicator like “number of complaints
about human rights violations” leave ample room for
partners to have very different notions of what the ob-
jective implies or the indicator means. Performance
benchmarks thus have a specificity and clarity that
make them particularly suitable for impact assessment
and evaluation in connection with this dialogue model. 
4.2.2 Impact Assessment Based on Indicators
Policy changes can also be identified with the help of
solidly constructed indicators, because they can cap-
ture absolute events, as well as the quality and scope
of changes. The essential prerequisite for the develop-
ment and the use of such indicators is, as in the case
of performance benchmarks, the availability of data on
the actual state of affairs.
Figure 6 illustrates how multi-dimensional quantitative
indicators can be used for measuring the achievement
of the objective “boosting the role of the supreme
court in the review of death sentences”.
Figure 6 Strengthening the supreme court in reviewing
death sentences: possible indicators 
Such multi-dimensional indicators make it possible for
the partners to control the implementation of a com-
paratively manageable, human rights-related policy
over a planning horizon of several years.
In choosing a particular model of impact assessment,
that is, in deciding whether primarily to use perfor-
mance benchmarks or indicators, the partners will also
take into consideration the policy area in question.
Thus, independent institutions like the judiciary and 
national human rights institutions cannot simply be told
what their results are to be (“the supreme court reverses
a certain percentage of all rulings by courts of first 
instance”; “the national human rights institution brings
a certain percentage of complaints to court”). Here, 
indicators seem to be much more appropriate. But for
institutions bound by orders and instructions, such as
prison administrations and police stations, the partners
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Dimension Operationalisation Possible Indicators 
Result in
terms of 
absolute
number
Number in a
specific 
period of time 
Number of death 
sentences examined 
by the Supreme Court 
Result on 
specific le-
vels 
Number on a
specific level /
period of time /
particular 
region / 
with a view to 
a particular
community  
Number of death sentences
passed between year x and
year z reviewed by the 
Supreme Court; 
number of death sentences
passed against members of
certain communities 
(or: passed for certain 
crimes) which were review-
ed by the Supreme Court
Result in
terms 
of scope
Percentage Percentage of all primary
court sentences (per year)
handing down the death
sentence; percentage of all
Supreme Court rulings 
confirming the death 
penalty
can indeed agree on specific targets to be checked
against performance benchmarks, as the examples
have shown.
To sum up: Dialogues that aim at changing specific poli-
cies have clear and manageable objectives. Their impact
is comparatively easy to observe. Sustainable data 
collection by the partner is a necessary part of such 
dialogues. However, it is not an end in itself but a pre-
requisite for transparency and accountability, and as
such an essential contribution to changing the respec-
tive policy.
4.3 Dialogue Model: 
Improving the Human Rights Situation
Many human rights dialogues and programmes for the
promotion of human rights intend to improve the 
human rights situation on the ground. This is a very
complex goal because the partners want to bring about
changes in all areas of human rights protection. They
must try to put an end to human rights violations (and
if necessary to investigate and prosecute perpetra-
tors), as well as to create the conditions for a sustain-
able institutionalization of human rights. Raising public
awareness of human rights can also be an objective.
Strategies, target groups, and instruments for such 
dialogues must therefore be accordingly complex. The
capabilities of civil society must be enhanced, just like
those of human rights-related agencies in cities and
rural areas. Mechanisms for lodging complaints must
be set up or strengthened, human rights education
must be institutionalized, and finally, human rights
violations must be reduced in both number and degree.
With the objectives being so complex, impact assess-
ment must meet very tough requirements. The follow-
ing sections will discuss two possibilities. Section 4.3.1
explains how impact of such a dialogue can be mea-
sured by examining the reduction in human rights
abuses. Section 4.3.2 looks at ways of measuring the
impact of such dialogues multi-dimensionally. In other
words, how can changes in the number of human
rights violations, as well as changes in policies that aim
to institutionalize human rights, be documented?
To summarize the findings before-hand: The comparison
of both methods shows that the multi-dimensional
approach to monitor changes in the human rights 
situation is more appropriate than a form of impact 
assessment that just measures the number of human
rights violations.
4.3.1 Measuring the Reduction in 
Human Rights Violations
As perceived by the public, improvements in the human
rights situation correlate with a reduction in the number
and gravity of human rights abuses. Human rights 
dialogues aiming at improving the overall human rights
situation have to face these expectations and must
therefore try particularly hard to employ transparent
forms of impact assessment, as well as to pursue appro-
priate communication strategies.
There are several methods for measuring human rights
violations. Currently, the most frequently used methods
are indices and qualitative benchmarks. They will be de-
scribed in the following sections. First, however, it
should be mentioned that both methods are above all
suitable for an ex post analysis of the human rights 
situation. But they cannot be used for monitoring the
impact of a human rights dialogue and for evaluating
it in the technical sense defined above.
4.3.1.1 Impact Assessment Based on Indices
4.3.1.1.1 Freedom House Index
The Freedom House Index is probably the best-known
index in political science. It is based on standards or
qualitative benchmarks respectively. Experts evaluate
the global situation of certain civil and participatory
rights by analyzing media reports. Freedom House then
converts these assessments into a numerical scale and
divides them into the categories political rights and
civil liberties.60 Next, the average of the values of these
two categories is used to classify the country as “free”,
“partially free”, and “not free”. For some countries, the
index covers the period from 1973 to 2004, a time
span long enough to be relevant. 
In spite of the harsh criticism levelled at the index,61 it
is still being used by scholars62 and development prac-
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60 For a detailed description of this method see Freedom House (2003).
61 UNDP (2000), 91. Goldstein’s criticism is particularly scathing (1992), 48: “… the basis for assigning of scores seems to be
entirely impressionistic; … the scales are obscure, confusing, and inconsistent and change from year to year.”
62 In addition to other sources, Keith (1999) uses the Freedom House Index for her analysis of the impact of human rights 
conventions.
titioners. Thus, the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) uses the Freedom House Index to
measure the achievement of the objectives of USAID 
activities intended to enhance the rule of law and the
respect for human rights.63 
Yet how sensitive is the index to changes? The classi-
fication as “not free” has not changed over the past
twenty years for 43 per cent of the 161 countries, for
which the Freedom House Index provides data for the
period from 1983 to 2003. For 25 per cent of these
countries the index does not show any change in any
year. At the other end of the scale, 23.6 per cent of the
countries have consistently been classified as “free”. This
means that the index documents any fluctuations bet-
ween “not free”, “partially free” and “free” for only 33
per cent of the countries.64 Given this lack of sensitivity
of the Freedom House Index, it would seem quite prob-
lematic to use a country’s rank in the index as a solid
basis for monitoring the achievement of activities
aimed at promoting human rights, as it has been 
suggested by USAID.
4.3.1.1.2 Human Rights Indices
The Danish Human Rights Institute has developed an
index that is explicitly oriented towards human rights.
It is especially designed to manage and monitor the in-
stitute’s projects in development cooperation. Four
separate indices are used to measure the government’s
commitment to civil and political rights, to economic,
social and cultural rights, as well as to women’s rights.65
In addition, the formal commitment of countries is
measured and grouped by region (see section 4.1.1
above).
Sano and Lindholt develop the index for the commit-
ment to civil and political rights on the basis of human
rights violations as counted in the country reports re-
leased annually by human rights organizations (amnesty
international, Human Rights Watch) and the U.S. De-
partment of State. However, they only draw on data for
the late 1990s. As yet, the index therefore does not 
cover a sufficiently long time span.
The CIRI Index, a database maintained by political
scientists David Cingranelli and David Richards, is based
on almost exactly the same data. This database covers
195 countries for the period from 1981 to 2003. Like
the index of Sano and Lindholt, it uses the human
rights violations recorded in the annual reports by the
U.S. Department of State and amnesty international and
then aggregates these data in separate indices.66 Two
of these indices are the Index for Physical Integrity
Rights and the Index for Empowerment Rights shown
below in Figure 7.67 Both indices run on numerical
scales from zero (no respect for these rights) to eight
and ten respectively (no violations of these rights).
The database is a working tool for political scientists.
Like the index developed by Sano and Lindholt, how-
ever, it is also intended as an instrument for monitor-
ing the impact of human rights policy (as well as of
other policies) on the number of human rights abuses.68
Figure 7 samples data from the index: 
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63 USAID (1998), 14. USAID develops its own indicators only for subordinate objectives, such as improving the normative 
environment and setting up mechanisms for lodging complaints. 
64 Percentage calculations based on: Freedom House (2004). The calculations include only those countries, for which continuous
data are available for the period from 1984 to 2003 (n=161). The various ranks “free”, “partially free”, and “not free” were
assigned numerical values.
65 The basic problem with this index is the different nature of the things that Sano and Lindholt measure. In the case of civil
and political rights they measure violations of the norms, in the case of economic, social, and cultural rights they measure
compliance with the norms, and in the case of women’s rights they measure the degree to which women are discriminated
against: Sano / Lindholt (2002), 5.
66 The coding rules are very transparent, see Cingranelli / Richards (2004).
67 Physical integrity rights: violations of the right to protection from extralegal execution, forced disappearances, torture and
imprisonment for political reasons. Empowerment rights: violations of the right to free movement, free speech, political 
participation, freedom of religion, as well as of workers’ rights. Unlike other indices, the CIRI database also includes compre-
hensive data on violations of women’s rights.
68 In the words of the authors: “It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and
consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights 
effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid,
structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.” Cingranelli / Richards (2004a).
Figure 7 Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights Indices, 1983-2003 
Both indices show considerable movement. Respect
for empowerment rights, that is, among other things,
the right to political participation, has been stagnant
at the lowest level since 1988. By contrast, respect for
physical integrity rights has visibly moved between
intermediate values and the lowest level. Since 2000,
it has been falling steadily though.
As opposed to the Freedom House Index, the two 
indices by Cingranelli and Richards appear to be con-
structed in such a way as to make them relatively sen-
sitive even to short and medium-term changes. If, by
the way, the picture presented in Figure 7 were to
represent an assessment of the success of human rights
policy towards a specific country, there would be cause
for alarm concerning the effectiveness of the instru-
ments employed.
To sum up, indices may be used to capture human
rights violations, and to that effect they can, in the
colloquial sense of the word, be used as indicators for
the success of human rights dialogues. The main caveat
concerns the data the indices themselves are based on,
as mentioned above. Furthermore, the resulting picture
will be rather sobering. A more serious limitation of im-
pact assessment by indices, however, is the fact that,
like every ex post analysis, it does not answer the 
question of how to improve policy or human rights dia-
logues respectively.
4.3.1.2 Impact Assessment Based on 
Qualitative Benchmarks
Most often, qualitative benchmarks are used for mea-
suring human rights violations, for example in the con-
text of human rights impact assessments.69 They are
better known, however, in connection with the work of
amnesty international and Human Rights Watch. The
method also appears to be employed as a model for the
evaluation of the EU dialogues. On the basis of these
examples, the following sections will show how quali-
tative benchmarks are applied to the documentation of
human rights violations.
4.3.1.2.1 Qualitative Benchmarks in 
Annual Country Reports
The country reports by amnesty international and 
other institutions that release annual reports use quali-
tative benchmarks, that is to say, certain standards
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69 The only available handbook to date was published by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation: NORAD (2001).
It is intended to help the agency’s staff to check each project as to its contribution and its expected impact with regard to
human rights. The following criteria are to be checked: equality/non-discrimination; the right to participate and to organize;
the right to information; the right of the poor to procure a minimum income and food; and the opportunity to file complaints
when rights are violated. The handbook can thus be seen as an attempt to prevent human rights violations by interventions
of development cooperation or corporate investments. It is not intended to be used as a basis for the promotion of human
rights though.
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derived from, above all, civil and political rights. The
most important events in a particular country are then
reviewed in light of these standards. The continuous
flow of information provided by regularly published
country reports can thus be combined into a picture of
developments and qualitative changes in the human
rights situation.
Annual reports do not attempt to quantify the human
rights situation, however. To be sure, numbers are used
in the description of events, for example the number of
people arrested at a demonstration. But the purpose of
these numbers is simply to illustrate the seriousness of
violations, not to quantify them in absolute numbers.
This is how the American political scientist Claude and
his colleague Jabine, a prominent statistician, sum-
marize the character of these annual reports: “While the
reliability … is often reputed to be very high …they do
not provide systematic and comprehensive coverage of
human rights violations. Each group operates under the
constraints of its respective mandate and resources,
leaving lacunae in geographic, topical, and temporal
coverage.”70
As these reports emphasize selected events and quali-
tative changes, they are used for impact measuring only
indirectly, namely in form of the indices mentioned
above. USAID is alone in using the reports of the U.S.
Department of State as a basis for assessing the human
rights situation qualitatively, and, as mentioned earlier,
the Freedom House Index for gauging the success of its
programmes to promote democracy and the rule of law.
4.3.1.2.2 Qualitative Benchmarks in EU Human Rights
Dialogues, Especially the EU Dialogue with Iran
The EU employs qualitative benchmarks for evaluating
its human rights dialogues.71 Because of the limited 
access to EU documents, it is impossible to tell whether
they are also used for monitoring dialogues.72 However,
the EU uses the term benchmark rather inconsistently
and, unlike this study, without distinguishing between
qualitative benchmarks and performance benchmarks.
As far as the units of measurement for assessing the
success of the EU human rights dialogues are concerned,
EU documents use both the term criteria and benchmarks.
Their exact meaning, however, remains unclear.73
Goals of EU Human Rights Dialogues
The goals of EU human rights dialogues are, by contrast,
stated relatively clearly. The 2001 guidelines for human
rights dialogues stipulate that such dialogues are to
pursue various political objectives that are to be ad-
justed to the situation in the country concerned. The list
of objectives comprises the following items:
the discussion of issues that concern both sides;
the intensification of the cooperation on human
rights issues at the multilateral level, for example
within the United Nations framework;
the expression of the EU’s concern over the human
rights situation in the respective country;
the attempt to collect information on the human
rights situation and to improve the latter.74
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70 Claude / Jabine (1992), 25-26. For similar criticism of events-based monitoring, see also Landman (2005), 22-23; 
Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 16-22.
71 On the terminology of EU human rights dialogues, see footnote 1, above.
72 See footnote 5, above. The available documents do not reveal either whether the impact of EU dialogues is assessed by any
means other than interviews with the participants in the dialogue meetings.
73 Here a short overview of the various formulations: “The European Union will also, on a case-by-case basis, establish criteria
for measuring the progress achieved in relation to the benchmarks and also criteria for a possible exit strategy.“ Council of
the EU (2001), para 6 (2) (italics in the original).
“It welcomes Iran’s agreement, … on the principle that both parties would enter into a dialogue with no pre-conditions, that
all human rights issues could be discussed under the dialogue, that each party could choose to terminate the dialogue at
any time, and that realistic and concrete benchmarks to evaluate progress would need to be established.” Council of the EU
(2002a), 10 para 2. 
“The EU should establish a set of benchmarks to evaluate progress in a human rights dialogue and an exit strategy, if no pro-
gress is achieved within a reasonable period of time.” … “The European Union is committed to deal with the priority issues, which
shall be included in the agenda for every dialogue meeting.” Council of the EU (2002), para 3 (A), 4 (italics in the original). 
74 Council of the EU (2001), para 4.
According to the 2001 guidelines then, improvements
in the human rights situation are only one of several
possible goals. However, a more precise statement can
be found in a communication on the implementation
of this guideline, which was published by the Working
Party on Human Rights (COHOM) at the end of 2004:
Improvements in the human rights situation are con-
sidered a criterion for the continuation or discontinu-
ation of a dialogue and therefore a direct goal of EU 
human rights dialogues.75
Goals of the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue 
and Benchmarks for the Dialogue
With regard to the dialogue between the EU and Iran
(2002-2004), improvements in the human rights situ-
ation had already been chosen as the goal relatively
early.76 Accordingly, the EU was thinking about bench-
marks for the Iran dialogue as early as 2002. The EU
Council came up with the following list:
the signing, ratification, and implementation of inter-
national human rights instruments;
cooperation with UN special rapporteurs as well as
the working groups set up by the United Nations;
improvements with regard to the death penalty and
particularly cruel forms of punishment, such as stoning;
improvements concerning the prevention and abo-
lition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degra-
ding treatment or punishment;
improvements with regard to discrimination;
improvements in the penal system;
the guarantee of openness, access, and transparency.77
Because of the limited access to EU documents, it is im-
possible to discern whether these qualitative bench-
marks were pegged to a time frame.78
To be sure, the benchmarks formulated by the EU for
the dialogue with Iran are, on the whole, very far-
reaching, but precisely because of this they are very soft.
They demand improvements in almost all areas of civil
and political rights, and they do so, at least as far as one
can tell, without laying down clear guidelines.79 Almost
every political system would need several decades for
such developments. The benchmarks’ lack of determi-
nacy, however, also makes it very difficult for the part-
ners to come to an understanding about the results of
the dialogue, especially with regard to all issues that
go beyond legislative measures.
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75 “Decisions [on engaging in structured human rights dialogues] … will be taken case-by-case on the basis of the criteria of
art 6.1 of the guidelines on human rights dialogues, extended on the basis of the experience gained in the process of eva-
luating the EU human rights dialogues with China and Iran: - major concerns on the part of the EU about the human rights
situation on the ground in the country concerned, – genuine commitment on the part of the authorities of the country 
concerned with regard to a human rights dialogue with the EU and to improve the human rights situation on the ground, –
a positive impact of a human rights dialogue on the human rights situation on the ground should reasonably be expected.”
Council of the EU, COHOM (2004), 5, para 4.
The same development can also be observed in the goals of Swiss human rights dialogues, albeit in the other direction. In
2000, for example, the Swiss Federal Council declared improvements in the human rights situation to be a criterion for the
continuation of human rights dialogues, and therefore a goal: Bundesrat (2000), 2592. In the same spirit, a press release at
the start of the Swiss-Iranian dialogue in 2003 stated that the two countries “had made a contribution to the improvement
of the still difficult human rights situation in Iran”: Confoederatio Helvetica (2003). With its Medium-Term Concept, the
Swiss foreign ministry released a more precise statement to the effect that the goals of the dialogues included improvements
in the normative environment, improvements in the two countries’ mutual trust, the enhancement of implementation 
mechanisms, as well as the promotion of local human right groups: DFA (2004).
76 See, for example, the terms of reference for the experts who participated in the first round of the dialogue in 2002: “The 
objective of an EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue is to bring about concrete improvements in the human rights situation in
Iran. The Iranian authorities will be asked to formulate their objectives.” Council of the EU (2002), II, para 1. 
Elsewhere, the EU was quite explicit: “The Council stresses the importance it attaches to the opportunity presented by such
a dialogue to bring about concrete improvements in the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Iran.” …
“The Council expects determined progress in the essential reform of the judicial system and with respect to the enforcement
of the rule of law …” “Recalling that the purpose of the dialogue is to achieve concrete progress on the ground, the Council
agrees to assess the results of the dialogue on a regular basis.”: Council of the EU (2002a), 10, 11. 
77 Ibid.
78 Concrete targets have repeatedly been suggested to the EU by third parties, see: FIDH (2002); Human Rights Watch (2002).
There is some question as to whether the EU has ever agreed on its benchmarks with its Iranian partner. Informed observers
say that it never happened.
79 With these benchmarks the EU undercuts its own guidelines on human rights dialogues, which emphasize the importance of
setting realistic benchmarks, and with good reason. Unrealistic or hazy benchmarks are liable to jeopardize the credibility of
the dialogue. Public opinion is justified in asking why dialogues are continued when there has not been any noticeable progress
in terms of the benchmarks. Observers may conclude that human rights dialogues are not an appropriate instrument of policy.
Dialogue partners may wonder why benchmarks are stipulated to begin with if they have no role in the further conduct of
the dialogue as it is continued even if the benchmarks are not met. They might assume that benchmarking is a purely formal
exercise.
Analyzing the Evaluation of the EU-Iran Dialogue
As shown above, the goals of the EU-Iran dialogue
comprise improvements in the normative environment
as well as a reduction in the number of violations. As
far as can be inferred from the accessible documents
and statements by participants, the EU measures the
achievement of these goals by a combination of 
standards-based and events-based monitoring; and
the evaluation of the EU Iran dialogue issued in 
October 2004 uses the qualitative benchmarks men-
tioned above. The events that occurred during the 
period under scrutiny are interpreted in terms of these
benchmarks in order to conclude whether the country
has moved forward or backward with regard to human
rights.80 This method is similar to the one employed by
amnesty international in its annual reports (see section
4.3.1.2.1, above).81 And as far as the results are con-
cerned, the EU evaluation is similar to the country reports
of human rights organizations, too: There is a clear em-
phasis on the documentation of human rights abuses.
Overall, this form of evaluation by qualitative bench-
marks captures the actual state in various areas at a
point in time chosen arbitrarily.82 But it remains unclear
how violations, events, and policy changes are con-
nected with each other.
This type of qualitative benchmarking is hardly suitable
for monitoring dialogues and assessing their impact if
the dialogues aim at comprehensive improvements in
the human rights situation. Qualitative benchmarks of
this type are therefore also problematic for evaluating
dialogues, because this method does not allow to pose
the question whether measures agreed on in the dia-
logue are in fact responsible for particular events. Yet,
the logic of intervention, and thus the logic of assess-
ment, are relevant for an evaluation in the technical
sense that does not only focus on changes in the situ-
ation but also on the effectiveness of the instrument.
In the final analysis, the course of action chosen by the
EU is not the “evaluation of the dialogue with Iran” that
it was billed as. Rather, it is a review of the human
rights situation in certain areas of civil and political
rights after two years of dialogue.
In sum: The reduction in human rights abuses can 
indeed be measured and documented with the help of
indices and qualitative benchmarks. Both methods
make ex post assessments possible. They do not, how-
ever, permit any monitoring of the results of the dia-
logue or its evaluation in the technical sense.
Jumping ahead by briefly summarizing the main
thoughts of the following section: Even though ob-
servers of dialogues look particularly at the reduction
or increase of human rights violations, changes in the
human rights situation are a process with many dimen-
sions, and need to be measured them accordingly. 
4.3.2 Monitoring the Human Rights Situation
Multi-Dimensionally
Changes in the human rights situation comprise change
with respect to the occurrence of human rights abuses,
change with respect to policies relevant to human
rights, and change with respect to the normative en-
vironment. Such a comprehensive and multi-dimen-
sional view of the human rights situation is what
characterizes the work of the United Nations treaty
bodies that watch over the enforcement of human
rights conventions, as well as the work of special 
thematic and country rapporteurs. Accordingly, the
treaty bodies, more than anyone else, have for quite
some time been looking at ways of documenting
changes in the human rights situation quantitatively as
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80 The evaluation is accessible under the document number CFSP/PRES/HAG/1160/04, albeit without the text on pages 3 to 34,
which contains the assessment of the events during the period under scrutiny on which the evaluation hinges; see Council
of the EU, Presidency (2004).
81 As a matter of fact, the Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) released a similar assessment of the human
rights situation in July 2004, shortly before the evaluation of the dialogue by the EU: FIDH (2004). Also in the summer of
2004, Human Rights Watch published a report on torture and prison conditions in Iran: Human Rights Watch (2004).
82 As a matter of principle, this is true of the annual country reports by human rights organizations, which are compiled and
released at fixed times of the year. The EU-Iran dialogue was evaluated two years after the start of the first dialogue meeting.
It just so happened that the evaluation took place during the first few months after the 2004 elections for the Iranian 
parliament, which had all along been expected to produce a conservative majority. In a certain way, the evaluation served
the political purpose of allowing the EU to comment on the situation in Iran following the elections.
well as qualitatively. Institutions trying to operationalize
rights-based approaches, as well as to assess their 
impact, have also studied this question intensively in
recent years. Their thoughts and ideas can be utilized
for complex human rights dialogues as well.
In a study for UNDP on impact assessment with the help
of human rights indicators, for example, Maria Green
recommends that they should be classified as result-
oriented and process-oriented indicators. Result-
oriented indicators are to be used for measuring the 
implementation of the government’s human rights obli-
gations. Process-oriented indicators, on the other hand,
are to measure qualities of processes, i.e. whether they
meet criteria such as rights to non-discrimination, 
accountability and participation.83 Todd Landman of the
human rights centre at Essex uses similar categories. He 
proposes that the human rights situation, as well as
changes with regard to human rights, should be mea-
sured in terms of the normative environment (human
rights in principle), in terms of the respect for human
rights (human rights in practice), and in terms of poli-
cies intended to guarantee human rights (human rights
as outcomes of government policy). Rajeev Malhotra
and Nicolas Fasel of the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights come up with similar cate-
gories in a study dealing with human rights indicators.84
The normative advantage of these models lies in the rel-
ative proximity to the three-pronged state obligation,
which is based on the idea that the obligations of gov-
ernments consists of the obligation to respect, to pro-
tect, and to fulfil human rights.85 The operational ad-
vantage lies in the fact that successes regarding the
respect of human rights can be documented separate-
ly from successes regarding fulfilment, as well as from
successes in the normative environment. This opera-
tional advantage, however, is also what makes impact
assessments using this model quite expensive and very
demanding with respect to the amount of data re-
quired. Figure 8 offers some examples:
Figure 8 Improving the human rights situation: 
impact monitoring based on human rights indicators 
and benchmarks 
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83 Green (2001).
84 Landman (2005); Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 25-30; Malhotra / Fasel (2005a).
85 As Malhotra / Fasel (2005), 29 clearly state, the indicators are not derived from the three-pronged model of state obligations.
Indicators for the enjoyment of
rights or Outcome-indicators
Indicators of conduct or process Benchmarks/indicators of principle or structure 
Number of allegations of 
violence against women 
Number of allegations of violence against 
women examined by independent national 
institutions
Number of ratified human rights 
instruments relating to women’s rights,
e.g. CEDAW
Number of allegations of
torture/extra-judicial 
executions 
Number of allegations of torture/extra-judicial
executions examined by independent national
institutions; 
Number of allegations of torture/extra-judicial
executions committed against members of 
certain communities (ethnic minorities, urban
or rural poor).
Number of death 
sentences/executions; 
Budget share for legal aid; number of death
penalty cases where accused had access to 
legal aid. 
Average or minimum/
maximum period of 
pre-trial detention 
Length of pre-trial detention among different
categories of detainees.
Number of ratified human rights treaties
(international, regional)
Number and legal weight of reservations/
declarations to the treaties
Acceptance of individual complaint 
mechanism
Cooperation with UN-special rapporteurs
(permission for visits and follow-up etc.)
Implementation of treaties in national
constitution and legislation 
If this model is operationalized it becomes clear that
it contains human rights-related assumptions about a
relationship of cause and effect between the relevant
processes and results. The example in Figure 8, for in-
stance, assumes that
accountability will, in the long term, reduce the oc-
currence of violence against women and torture
(“allegations of violence against women or torture are
investigated by independent national institutions”);
free legal assistance in capital cases will lead to a
declining number of death sentences;
a decrease in the incidence of discrimination among
various groups of prisoners will reduce the total
length of time spent on remand.
These human rights specific assumptions about cause
and effect are certainly not sufficient for controlling
very complex dialogue activities and results. It is, for 
example, conceivable that the average length of pre-
trial detention is reduced, while discrimination be-
tween groups of prisoners is not. Yet the model des-
cribed above makes it quite easy to observe that there
can be improvements in the human rights situation,
even though human rights policies have not changed
fundamentally. Conversely, it is also conceivable that
policies affecting accountability change when, for 
example, a national human rights institution is estab-
lished and given a comprehensive mandate that permits
it to investigate individual cases effectively. It is nev-
ertheless possible that human rights violations will in-
crease, or at least that they will not decrease in the long
term. The model also allows observers to determine
whether this is the case.
On the whole, this indicator model, as proposed by
Maria Green and, in slightly modified form by Landman,
appears to be quite suitable for measuring the mani-
fold processes affecting the development of the human
rights situation. If solid indicators for activities and re-
sults are developed within the framework of this model,
it will also be suitable for impact assessment, and thus
for evaluating dialogues and the programmes of Tech-
nical Cooperation. It is hard to imagine that methods
requiring less data can be devised for measuring the im-
pact of dialogues aimed at improving the human rights
situation.
4.4 Conclusion: Impact Assessment 
for Human Rights Dialogues
As far as measuring the effectiveness of human rights
dialogues is concerned, it is important to employ termi-
nology that is both clear and appropriately refined.
Evaluation and impact monitoring are technical pro-
cedures intended, among other things, to analyze the
effectiveness of dialogues in achieving their goals and
objectives. In the case of ex post analyses the latter 
aspect does not apply, because such studies can only
reveal changes relative to the original situation at the
outset, whatever their cause may be. 
Dialogue partners should consciously choose methods
and units of measurement. In other words, they should
decide, above all, whether to use indicators or bench-
marking models, or a combination thereof, with a view
to the dialogue’s goals and objectives and the available
data. As a matter of principle, the continuous collection
of disaggregated data by the partner country’s insti-
tutions is an important part of dialogues.
The analysis of three possible models of dialogues,
each with a different kind of goal, finds that dialogue
partners can utilize qualitative benchmarks quite well
for measuring changes in the normative environment
(dialogue model 1). For assessing changes in human
rights policies, on the other hand, the partners should
prefer quantitative units of measurement, that is bench-
marking models, possibly in combination with indi-
cators (dialogue model 2). And if the dialogue partners
want to improve the overall human rights situation,
they should measure the effects not only in terms of the
reduction in human rights violations (dialogue model
3). Instead, in this kind of dialogue, they should also
take into consideration the other essential dimensions
of the human rights situation, such as changes in the
normative environment as well as in the relevant 
policy areas. The best way to do this is to apply an indi-
cator model adjusted for the purposes of human rights.
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Human rights dialogues should be defined clearly,
and they should be distinguished from other forms
of human rights talks.
Dialogues about the understanding of human rights,
individual human rights topics, the human rights 
situation, or concrete individual cases can take 
various forms. There are, for example, academic 
exchange programmes, activities aiming to improve
interfaith and intercultural communication, or pro-
jects designed to increase capacity at the level of 
civil society. The term human rights dialogue, how-
ever, should be used in a narrower sense. It is a well-
planned, long-term instrument of government human
rights policy aimed at the improvement of mutual
understanding and the achievement of results. As
such, it has been agreed on with a partner country
(and possibly other countries also). Its planning, as
well as its results, should be characterized by trans-
parency with regard to the partner and the public at
large. In addition, human rights and human rights
obligations can also be addressed in political dia-
logues.
Human rights dialogues should always be seen and
used in the context of other human rights instru-
ments.
Dialogue is one of several instruments of a govern-
ment’s policy towards human rights. In order to have
a positive impact and, if at all possible, to achieve
synergy, dialogues should always be seen and con-
ducted within the framework of the various instru-
ments of human rights policy. These instruments
should interlock and complement each other. Play-
ing human rights instruments off against each other
weakens the system of human rights protection as
a whole. The question is not whether pressure by
resolutions in and by itself is “better” than dialogues
or Technical Cooperation. Rather, it is which instru-
ments effectively promote human rights at a given
point in time, or over a given period of time (i.e., in
the short, medium, or long term). Each decision for
a particular instrument should be justified and
communicated in terms of these considerations, and
each instrument must be scrutinized for its results.
The chances of human rights dialogues to have any
effects depend on political factors.
The chances of human rights dialogues to have an
impact – as opposed to political pressure, for exam-
ple – depend on the following questions. To what 
extent, if at all, have human rights norms already 
become part of the partner country’s conception of
itself as a state? Do the government and other insti-
tutions of the state deal with international human
rights norms in a tactical and instrumental manner,
or do they fundamentally affirm the validity of the
norms as well as the need for dialogue and reforms?
Can groups and organizations of civil society in-
fluence the domestic policy debate on human rights?
The use of the various instruments of human rights
policy, including human rights dialogues, must be
consistent with developments in the domestic human
rights debate in the partner country.
Human rights dialogues must make use of inter-
national reference material.
At every step of the planning process, starting with
the situation analysis, the human rights standards
that are to be used as reference points should be for-
mulated as clearly as possible. They must also be up
to date with regard to the current state of the inter-
national system for the protection of human rights.
In addition to the fundamental texts containing the
norms themselves, such as human rights conventions
at the universal or regional level, these reference
standards also comprise the country-specific recom-
mendations of the treaty bodies and the various
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special rapporteurs of the United Nations as well as
the General Comments developed by the treaty bodies.
It must be emphasized that, according to the current
state of the international debate on human rights,
countries face three types of obligations. They must
respect human rights norms, they must protect them
from infringements by third parties, and they must
provide an institutional framework to ensure that
they can be effectively enjoyed in practice (obligat-
ion to fulfil). This understanding of the nature of state
obligations is essential for determining the human
rights situation and it should also be utilized for
fine-tuning objectives in human rights dialogues
and promotion.
The objectives of human rights dialogues should be
realistic and clearly defined.
As a matter of principle, the goal of dialogues should
be clearly defined and disclosed to the public of
one’s own country as well as to the public of the
partner country. Objectives should be defined in such
a way that they can actually be achieved with the
instrument of human rights dialogues. Thus, the
participants should formulate operative targets. 
In developing the objectives of a dialogue, the part-
ners should take into consideration how human
rights goals are connected with each other. Policy
measures adopted in human rights-related areas of
policy, for example, are connected to the human
rights situation by cause and effect, while the ratifi-
cation of a convention is linked to its implementa-
tion by providing a frame of reference for public
discourse and for national jurisdiction.
At the same time, it is imperative to ensure that the
various possible goals can be clearly distinguished
from each other. Improvements in the normative
environment in the partner country are an important
goal of human rights dialogues. The implementation
and enforcement of conventions, on the other hand,
must be seen as a distinct and very relevant goal of
dialogues.
For dialogues that include a component of Technical
Cooperation, it appears to make particular sense to
try to change specific human rights-related policies.
Policies designed to prevent torture or to guarantee
women’s access to the labour market, for example,
offer more than enough subject matter for long-
term dialogues. Such dialogues require the partners
to be cooperative and to have similar objectives and
expectations concerning their collaboration.
Questions of impact assessment should already be
addressed when the goals and objectives are defined,
as well as throughout the planning stage. In this con-
nection, the continuous gathering of meaningful
data on the human rights situation by the partners
is an essential objective of human rights dialogues
and human rights promotion. This is especially true
in the case of objectives that transcend improve-
ments in the normative environment and strive for
changes in human rights policy, as well as in the 
actual human rights situation in the partner 
country.
Human rights dialogues should be planned trans-
parently, and they should be coordinated with 
other actors as well. Appropriate methods must be
chosen for this purpose.
Human rights dialogues should be planned and carried
out clearly and transparently. Accountability, as an
essential principle of human rights policy in general,
should also be a guiding principle of human rights
dialogues and other measures of human rights pro-
motion.
The planning of dialogues and other actions or events
to promote human rights should utilize procedures
that make it possible to distinguish analytically bet-
ween objectives, activities and results.
Every dialogue needs a strategy as a reflection of
one’s own position and goals and of those of the
partners.
Human rights dialogues and Technical Cooperation
should be coordinated with other countries and donors.
The partners’ expectations in dialogues do not 
necessarily have to be identical, but they certainly
must be made quite clear. If the dialogue partner
wants to discuss certain topics, while blocking others
where serious violations can be discerned, one should
begin by trying to identify a common set of possible
topics acceptable to both sides.
Especially Western dialogue partners, or countries in
the northern hemisphere, should not reject topics
that address their own demonstrable weaknesses
with regard to the protection of human rights or
human rights violations.
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The objective of measuring the effects of human
rights dialogues should be defined clearly and ex-
pressed in the most precise language possible.
In order to ensure accountability and the capability
to learn, human rights dialogues – like all other 
interventions in complex political systems – should
be open to scrutiny with respect to the nature, scope
and quality of their effects.
Impact assessment cannot replace political analysis.
Nevertheless, it is an essential prerequisite for
guaranteeing the control of interventions as well as
the transparent description of processes and results.
Concerning the choice of the right method for mea-
suring the impact of activities, it must be acknow-
ledged that ex post analyses can indeed document
changes in the situation in the partner country. How-
ever, they cannot relate such changes to any specif-
ic activities and thus the effectiveness of the in-
struments employed cannot be assessed. The latter
is only possible with the more expensive methods of
impact monitoring and evaluation.
When choosing the forms and methods of impact 
assessment, the partners should take into consideration
the objectives of the dialogue and the data available.
Choosing the forms and methods of measuring the
impact of dialogues is one of the most important
planning tasks. As such, it depends on the dialogues’
goals and objectives.
For a well-managed dialogue the methods of impact
assessment should be chosen or developed together
with the partner country. Should this be impossible,
the partner must at least be informed about the
(unilaterally used) methods.
The continuous collection of disaggregated data by
the partner is an essential component of complex 
human rights dialogues.
Dialogues aiming at actual improvements in the 
human rights situation must apply complex forms
and methods of impact monitoring. For one thing,
one-dimensional forms of impact assessment, such
as documenting the number of human rights vio-
lations, will often paint a rather sobering picture of
the situation. For another, they fail to do justice to
the complexity of the goal. Multi-dimensional
approaches that can measure changes in the nor-
mative environment and in central policy areas, as
well as the results of the various policies, are much
more appropriate for dialogues with this goal.
In the case of dialogues that initially aim at changing
the normative environment qualitative benchmarks
pegged to a time frame can be used to measure the
achievement of their results and objectives.
For dialogues trying to change human rights specific
policies, performance benchmarks appear to be a
particularly suitable method of impact assessment.
Combining them with indicators makes it consider-
ably easier to monitor the political environment.
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